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ABSTRACT 
 
JUAN E. UGARRIZA: Ideologies and Conflict in the post-Cold War:  
Afghanistan, D.R. Congo, Colombia 
(Under the direction of John Chasteen) 
 
Ideology played an extensive role in the post-Cold War insurgencies examined here (the 
Taliban Movement, in Afghanistan; the Parti pour la Révolution des Peuples, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo; and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, in 
Colombia) beyond the discursive level. Ideology served the rhetorical purpose of legitimizing 
armed struggles, but it also proved crucial to determine the insurgent organizations’ internal 
structures and their apparatus of power in territories under their control, to shape their 
governmental policies, and to provide strategic and tactical gains in the battlefield. 
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To my mother. 
 
vFor us, our ideology is everything. 
And we believe that it is better to die for something 
than to live for nothing. 
 
Taliban diplomat, March 2001 
 
Let’s stop talking about democracy and elections. 
We are creating a new State built upon new values. 
 
Laurent Désiré Kabila, 1997 
 
We are Marxist-Leninists. We are for the socialist revolution 
on a world level that progresses toward communism. 
 
Member of FARC’s Bolivarian Youth, January 2004 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What is the role of ideologies in post-cold war internal armed conflicts? Have 
economic motivations completely sidelined ideological and political motivations? The 
absence of a deeper understanding of the role of ideologies in the post-Cold War has 
undermined the ability of scholars to explain coherently the dynamics of contemporary 
armed conflicts. This highly problematic shortcoming of scholarly research affects negatively 
the chances of success of international and governmental conflict resolution policies based 
upon it, as it leaves unaddressed a key component of modern insurgencies. This paper will 
demonstrate that ideologies play not only an important but fundamental role in explaining the 
dynamics of contemporary armed conflicts, though I do not claim this is the case of every 
armed insurrection. While authors like Francis Fukuyama and Paul Collier have greatly 
influenced the understandings of post-Cold War conflict by minimizing the role of ideology, 
I present evidence from three major societal conflicts pointing in the opposite direction. 
Since the eighteenth century, the term ‘ideology’ has been used in different contexts 
to denote different meanings. One of the most synthetic definitions given by modern Political 
Science explains it as “the project of creating social perfection by managing society”.1 
Philosopher Thomas Sowell suggests that ideologies are theories based on visions, which are 
one’s sense or feeling of how the world works, and that these visions can be of equality, 
 
1 Kenneth Minogue, “Ideology After the Collapse of Communism,” Political Studies, vol. 41, Special Issue, 
1993, 7-8. 
2power, justice and other sub categories.2 While these two definitions greatly contribute to the 
understanding of what an ideology is, this paper will use the term in a more sociological way, 
as a set of beliefs distinguished by a specific logic of relations between insiders and outsiders. 
3 As a result, ideologies are considered here to be primarily cultural systems that maybe 
influenced or shaped by power and economic relations. 
Ideology needs to be contrasted with the concept of identity. Mary Kaldor explains 
that “identity politics is about labels –and the right to political power and personal security 
on the basis of those labels”.4 Ideologies create and re-create these labels by making use of 
myths (collections of stories that become their emotional core5) and using them to convey to 
the masses a sense of belonging to a “chosen” group.6
While the two Cold War ideologies –liberal democracy and communism– did not 
primarily rely on identity politics, post-Cold War political projects have more explicitly 
manipulated identity and cultural differences. “The politicization of cultural differences,” 
explains Thomas Meyer, “has proved to be a universal instant recipe that is forever useful in 
stirring up public opinion which can then be converted in votes or approval wherever there 
are powers that seek to rule”.7 As a result, the creation and re-creation of political identities 
 
2 Thomas Sowell, A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, (New York: Basic Books, 
2002), 3-8. 
 
3 Minogue, 7-8. 
 
4 Mary Kaldor, Robin Luckham, “Global Transformations and New Conflicts,” Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS) Bulletin, vol. 32 no. 2, 2001, 56. 
 
5 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 12. 
 
6 Hartmund Elsenhans, foreword in Thomas Meyer, Identity Mania: Fundamentalisms and the Politicization of 
Cultural Differences, (London: Zed Books, 2001), xxi. 
 
7 Thomas Meyer, Identity Mania: Fundamentalisms and the Politicization of Cultural Differences, (London: Zed 
Books, 2001), 12. 
3since the 1990s has been a constant of political ideologies, 8 which also merge politics, 
economics, social relations, and ethics in such a way that they become a comprehensive 
interpretation of culture, through the implementation of ideological projects, culture itself is 
molded, changed and interpreted.9
Between 1989 and 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, scholars began to think 
that ideologies may have become a thing of the past. After defeating monarchy, fascism and 
communism, wrote Francis Fukuyama famously in 1989, “liberal democracy may constitute 
the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution”10 Fukuyama described the collapse of the 
communist utopia as a global coming back to senses, asserting that “the collapse of Marxist 
ideology in the late 1980s reflected, in a sense, the achievement of a higher level of  
rationality on the part of those who lived in such societies, and their realization that rational 
universal recognition could be had only in a liberal social order.”11 Fukuyama, not seeing any 
other global-reach ideology to compete with liberal democracy, declared it the solitary 
winner of history’s ideological struggles, not considering the multiple local projects that 
would emerge throughout the decade more than localized phenomena doomed to pass. 
Fukuyama himself acknowledged the existence of localized (or regional) alternative projects 
to liberal democracy. “It is true”, he said, “that Islam constitutes a systematic and coherent 
ideology, just like liberalism and communism, with its own code of morality and doctrine of 
political and social justice”. However, its supposed lack of appeal outside a particular region 
 
8 Ronaldo Munck, “Deconstructing Terror: Insurgency, Repression and Peace,” in Postmodern Insurgencies,
Ronaldo Munck, Purnaka L. De Silva eds. (New York: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), 4-5. 
 
9 Jonathan Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 
170-200. 
 
10 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 2006), xi. 
 
11 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 205. 
4led Fukuyama to dismiss Islam as a credible alternative to the global-applicable liberal-
democracy model12.
For some critics, the idea of end of ideologies, prophesized since the 1960s and 
heralded by Fukuyama in 1989, became in itself “an expression of the ideology of the time 
and place where it arose”.13 Globalization of liberal democracy, in terms of Ulrich Beck, 
constituted “another attempt at exporting Western modernization beyond its spatial and 
temporal confines”.14 Refuting Fukuyama, Susan Willett says that “the shift in preference for 
neo-liberal policies is ideologically motivated, rather than being determined by the efficacy 
of one model of development over another. Ideological fervor, spurred on by the 
triumphalism associated with the end of the Cold War, has in effect blinkered the dominant 
global institutions to the actual and prolonged effects of neo-liberal reform on the economic 
performance and security situation in the poorer parts of the world”.15 A main argument 
challenges his rationale about the absence of global-reach ideological competition in the 
post-Cold War, alleging that liberal democracy has still not yet assured a total conquest of 
human politics. “Instead of the grand (global) revolutionary projects of the past”, explain 
Kenneth Minogue, “we now have a set of overlapping fragments of revelation which 
cooperate with each other in social transformation”16. Manifestations of political Islam, 
 
12 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 45. 
 
13 Alasdair McIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age (London: Duckworth, 1971), 5. 
 
14 Ulrich Beck, What is Globalisation?, (Malden: Polity Press, 2000), cited in François Debrix, “Tricky 
Business: Challenging Risk Theory and its Vision of a Better Global Future,” in Confronting Globalization: 
Humanity, Justice and the Renewal of Politics, Patrick Hayden, Chamsy el-Ojeili eds. (Hampshire: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005), 90-96; see also Frederick Cooper, “What is the Concept of Globalization Good for? An 
African Historian’s Perspective,” African Affairs, Royal African Society, vol. 100, 189-213. 
 
15 Susan Willett, “Insecurity, Conflict and the New Global Disorder,” Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
Bulletin, vol. 32 no. 2, 2001, 37. 
 
16 Minogue, 4. 
5nationalism or neo-fascism that sprung up in the 1990s would be reflections of the newly 
shattered ideological world in which history, understood as humankind’s ideological struggle, 
has definitively not come to an end yet.17 
For some scholars, the spread of Fukuyama’s “triumphant ideology” and its clash 
with local ideological alternatives emerged or revitalized in the 1990s had a direct impact as 
well on the eruption or prolongation of armed conflicts around the world. Far from quelling 
people’s desire to fight, the spread of liberal-democratic ideals along with the globalization 
of economies created new political and economic motivations for conflict. Standing for one 
of the most common interpretations of economic-roots theories of conflict, Susan Willett 
points to liberal internationalism as “one of the major structural causes of current patterns of 
violence and conflict,” due to  “the general failure of neo-liberal policies underpinning the 
current phase of globalization, to deliver more equitable patterns of development to large 
parts of the world.”18 She sees local alternative ideologies, in turn, not as structural causes of 
conflict, which she identifies as “political, social and economic elements, such as the failure 
to meet basic human needs, population pressure, distributional injustice, the depletion of 
natural resources, environmental degradation and ethnic tensions.” Rather, according to her, 
alternative ideologies are “accelerating” or “triggering” factors, grouped with other triggers 
such as the abuse of political and military power, proliferation of small arms, and struggle for 
natural resources.19 
17 Bruce Cumings, “Time of Illusion: Post-Cold War Visions of the World,” in Cold War Triumphalism, (New 
York: The New Press, 2004), 87. 
 
18 Willett, 36. 
 
19 Willett, 36. 
6In general, the global discredit of ideologies as a useful category to account for war in 
the post-Cold War led some researchers to find new explanations for why armed conflict did 
persist into the 1990s, particularly the economic motivations for war.20 Among the most 
influential academic works aimed at describing the nature of armed conflicts in the 1990s is 
that conducted in Oxford by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. As a result of their statistical 
analysis, they concluded that 79 major conflicts between 1960 and 1999 could be explained 
in terms of greed and grievance: in other words, conflict surged when financial opportunities 
to build a rebel organization –geography, lootable natural resources, donations- existed, in a 
context of inequality, deprivation and/or ethnic-religious divisions.21 While this work has 
shed important light on the understanding of post-Cold War conflict, it has led to a dangerous 
underestimation of political and cultural dimensions of insurgencies. “Motivations for 
rebellion,” wrote Collier, “generally matter less than the conditions that make a rebellion 
financially and militarily viable.”22 Combining concepts derived from political science, 
sociology, anthropology, psychology and history, and drawing from previous works from the 
1980s, theories such as Symbolic Politics, Identity Politics and Manipulative Elites have 
contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of modern armed conflict, each of them 
 
20 See Valpy Fitzgerald, “The International Political Economy of Conflict in Poor Countries,” in F. Stewart, 
Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates, War and Underdevelopment, (Oxford University Press: 2001), 204-224; also 
Karen Ballentine, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict,” 
in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman eds. (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 2003), 259-284; and Murshed, S. Masoob, “Globalization, Marginalization and Conflict,” in 
Globalization, Poverty and Conflict, Max Spoor ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 67-80. 
 
21 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 56 no. 
4, 20 Ago. 2004, 563-595; Internet, available at http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/4/563;
Accessed on 9 Jan. 2006. An earlier version including data of 166 countries was published by World Bank, 
Development and Comp Systems 0409007, EconWPA; Internet, available at www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/06/17/000094946_00060205420011/Rendered/
PDF/multi_page.pdf; Accessed on 11 Jan. 2006. 
 
22 Paul Collier, “The Market for Civil War,” Foreign Policy, no. 136, May-Jun 2003, 40-45. 
7stressing on the importance of symbols, identities and leadership.23 However, these narrow 
categories of analysis have prevented the mentioned theories from providing a more solid 
and comprehensive account of the dynamics of war. 
This paper assumes that the economic-roots theories of conflict do not provide a full 
description of the dynamics of contemporary armed conflicts, and that Symbolic, Identity 
Politics and Manipulative Elites approaches, though they explain partial processes, fall short 
of providing a comprehensive complement to an economic emphasis. Authors like Karen 
Ballentine have suggested that, besides the existence of economic incentives, political and 
ideological goals have played a crucial role in the persistence of armed conflicts since 199124;
while Nancy S. Love has explicitly conferred on ideology three concrete roles in 
contemporary war: to legitimize political systems, to help socialize individuals, and to 
mobilize people.25 Building on their theoretical contributions, I analyze three sample cases in 
the search for evidence of the concrete role of ideologies in contemporary armed conflicts, 
and in order to test the concept of ideology as a broader, more useful category than identity, 
symbols, myths or leadership, all ultimately encompassed in it.  
The great influence exerted by contemporary economic approaches to explain armed 
conflicts and the absence of a systematized effort to collect and interpret evidence that 
supports the crucial role of ideologies together undermine the understanding of insurgencies 
as political phenomena, not only limiting scholarly explanatory power but narrowing the 
 
23  Miles Hewstone, Ed Cairns, “Social Psychology and Intergroup Conflict,” in Ethnopolitical Warfare 
(American Psychological Association), 319-342; Anthony Oberschall, “Conflict and Peacemaking in Divided 
Societies,” in Peace Making and Post Conflict Reconstruction, Bruno Coppieters, Pierre Du Toit, Anthony 
Oberschall eds. (to be published in 2007); Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic 
Wars, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 5-8. 
 
24 Ballentine, 259-281. 
 
25 Nancy S. Love, Understanding Dogmas & Dreams, second ed., (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2006), 8. 
8options for a peaceful resolution that could put an end to the suffering of millions. Ignoring 
the importance of ideological warfare impedes a comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomena of armed insurgencies in the 1990s and reinforces an incomplete view that in turn 
undermines the chances of finding a realistic approach to put and end to the human tragedy 
of war. Assessing the crucial impact ideologies have in prolonging and fueling violent 
conflict is the only realistic course of action, not only to understand the nature of internal 
warfare since 1989, but to devise formulas aimed at quelling them. 
The existence and importance of ideology as a hardcore essential component in post-
Cold War insurgencies can be demonstrated by an analysis of evidence collected on three 
sample cases, dispersed geographically and culturally, and affected by structural violence and 
organized insurgencies all throughout the post-Cold War to the present. An analysis of 
internal documents, communiqués, public statements and interviews with insurgent 
organizations in the 1990s Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) 
and Colombia demonstrates that, in spite of a worldwide discredit of ideologically-motivated 
conflicts, their success in holding on to an ideological core made them viable as political 
actors, independently from the existence of economic and military considerations. Their 
ideological core, this paper shows, is far from being a monolithic dogma. The capability of 
these insurgent organizations to make ideology malleable and adaptable constitutes an 
explanation of their durability. Evidence indicates that ideology effectively guides crucial 
decision-making processes of the insurgencies’ leadership studied, which invested a 
significant amount of effort and resources to develop an ideological discourse aimed at their 
internal, national and international audiences. 
 
9The first chapter of this paper is dedicated to examining the main characteristics of 
ideological discourses in the post-Cold War. First, I will show how the cases described 
provide solid evidence of consistent advancement of political agendas and projects by the 
insurgent groups. The production of political texts, their level of refinement, the complexity 
of their argumentation, and their concern to systematically educate the ranks contradict some 
academic interpretations that minimize the ideological content of insurgencies in the post-
Cold War era. The persistence of a political discourse, I will argue, demands a new 
understanding of insurgencies not only as socio-economic and military phenomena but also 
as moral responses to conflictive contexts, to which the insurgents intend to offer alternative 
–even if questionable- responses. 
But what is different in the 1990s from the models of insurgency prevalent during the 
Cold War? The crisis spread over revolutionary insurgencies all over the world after the end 
of the communist experiment in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 
1991 put an end to many protracted armed struggles. But warfare stubbornly persisted in 
Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia, among other countries. Their 
insurgencies would have not survived long had they stuck to old Cold War models of 
ideological confrontation, and hence in the first chapter I will explain how the insurgencies 
there managed to survive as historical projects adapting their ideological stances during the 
1990 and beyond the threshold of the twenty-first century by re-creating a more flexible and 
adaptable set of nationalistic, religious and socialist discourses. 
The existence of reinvigorated discourse, however, does not represent by itself solid 
evidence of real political commitment. How relevant is the ideological discourse in the 
insurgents’ tactics and strategy? In the second chapter, I assess the relative importance of 
10
their ideological component in insurgent action. I will show how the insurgents’ organic 
structure and political agenda are mainly determined by a doctrines associated with 
ideological principles rather than economic or autocratic interests. The insurgents’ 
commitment to particular forms of the State, economy and legal order demonstrates 
revolutionary zealousness emerging from the leadership, and flowing down to the ranks, 
challenging the notion of contemporary rebels as being merely economically driven. 
But if ideology only provides a long term vision (agenda) and an organizational 
template, it may well become simply a background justification for their military plans, and 
the need to achieve practical economic and military gains would reduce the political 
dimension to a discursive level. I will demonstrate how ideological discourses are aimed to 
produce both tactical and strategic gains. The hardcore indoctrination of guerrillas in a 
particular religious school (in the Afghan case) or socialist models (in the Congo and 
Colombia) served to maintain internal cohesion and discipline, while nationalism played a 
crucial role in providing these organizations with a vehicle through which to convey their 
political stances to national populations. At an international level, in turn, the studied 
insurgencies demonstrated their ability to create international linkages that not only 
reinforced and informed their own ideological orientation, but also generated practical and 
tangible support for their subversive campaigns.  
In addition, insurgencies in the post-Cold War made their own ideological doctrines 
much more flexible, sticking to basic core values (e.g. social justice, purity), but adapting 
their specific political agendas to changing contexts. Nationalism adds an identitarian and 
emotional component to armed struggles previously rationalized as a morally justified 
opposition to a particular state of things. Precisely due to its emotional character, nationalism 
11
needs to be revisited and reinvigorated constantly, in order to prolong its effectiveness in the 
context of protracted wars.  But the ultimate force behind nationalism in the cases presented 
here is the rational commitment to the advancement of political-military agenda rather than 
economic greed or opportunity.  
 
CHAPTER II 
IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSES IN THE POST-COLD WAR 
 
This paper will show how ideological confrontation, far from disappearing, adapted 
and survived in the post-Cold War era. During the second half of the twentieth-century, the 
worldwide ideological confrontation between liberal-democratic and socialist blocs created a 
context of validation of armed confrontation on the basis of legitimate clashing political 
visions. As a result, the advancement of an ideological discourse became a useful strategy for 
armed organizations in the search for a rationale to pursue their political-military plans. 
Throughout the Cold War period, before 1989, ideological discourses provided local 
insurgent groups with a place in a global-scale confrontation and a primary standard of 
differentiation from other types of organized violence. In the post-Cold War era, the demise 
of this overarching global framework of bipolar political confrontation undermined the logic 
of armed insurgencies everywhere and raised questions about the explanatory power of 
ideology in violent insurrections. Active insurgencies in the 1990s, however, did not 
renounce basic ideological commitments and demonstrated flexibility in adapting their 
discourses to the changing contexts of the late twentieth and early twentieth-first centuries. 
The sample cases analyzed here provide evidence that highlights the continuity of politically-
motivated ideological platforms in armed insurgencies after 1989. This chapter will first 
13
demonstrate how armed insurgencies in Afghanistan (Taliban, 1994-present)26, D.R. Congo 
(L.D. Kabila, 1964-2001)27 and Colombia (FARC, 1964-present) have consistently advanced 
an ideological discourse since their inception; secondly, it will show how, during the first 
decade of the post-Cold War era, marked by the absence of a global reference of ideological 
confrontation, these discourses experimented a process of re-creation and adaptation to 
changing circumstances. 
Francis Fukuyama predicted in 1989 that no other global-reach ideology would stand 
to compete against liberal democracy in the post-Cold War. However, he acknowledged the 
potential of two locally-based phenomena to challenge it at local level: fundamentalism and 
nationalism.28 In the twentieth-first century, some scholars have acknowledged the potential 
of nationalism and religious doctrines as ‘organizing ideologies’ in post-Cold war politics, 
while political agendas like human rights and environmental protection fall into a lower 
ideological category of the post-Soviet order. 29 Added to Nationalism and religious 
Fundamentalism, and in defiance of theoretical interpretations of revolutionary socialism as 
an unrealistic option after the demise of the Soviet bloc, strong evidence demonstrates the 
high levels of commitment towards socialist utopias among insurgent groups in countries 
such as Colombia, Congo, Nepal, Spain, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico or Iraq. The re-
emergence of revolutionary socialism as a credible ideology can be explained by a 
 
26 The Taliban took over the Afghan capital in 1996 and formed a national government, mostly not recognized 
internationally, until 2001. 
 
27 After founding the Parti pour la Révolution des Peuples (PRP), Laurent Désiré Kabila led guerrilla warfare 
against the government of Mobutu Sese Seko until 1997, when he established a national government, though 
Congolese internal warfare continued even after his death in 2001. 
 
28 Francis Fukuyama, “Have We Reached the End of History?,” Rand Library Collection, Feb. 1989, 17. 
 
29 Andrea K. Rienner, “Semi-Periphery States During the Post-Cold War Era: Theory Meets Practice,” Aris 
Security Studies, vol. 5, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002), 97-98. 
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fundamental change undertaken by socialist dogmas after 1991. Not only have they gained in 
flexibility to adapt to the new world context, but they have successfully combined with 
nationalism.  
This research suggests that armed conflicts since the 1990s are cross-cut by three 
major ideologies: nationalism, socialism and religious fundamentalism, in versions 
characterized by flexibility and adaptability. In this chapter, I first analyze the case of 
Afghanistan, to argue that the Taliban Movement founded in 1994, which has been fighting a 
civil war until the present day, created, expanded and adapted an indigenous ideology that 
combined Nationalism and religious Fundamentalism. Second, I examine the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (former Zaire) and the insurgency led by Laurent Désiré Kabila since the 
1960s, particularly his military victory in the 1990s and his rule until 2001, to show how a 
careful historical examination demonstrates Kabila’s lifetime commitment to a socialist 
ideology, long after the chances of undertaking a national socialist revolution waned in 
former Zaire. And finally I examine the Colombian case, particularly the four decade 
insurgency of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), their apparently 
anachronistic fidelity to Marxism-Leninism, and their own post-Cold War make-over as 
nationalist liberators. 
 
Afghanistan: Building the Nation of the Pure
As an organic movement, the Taliban dates back to1994, but many of its founders 
took part in the nationalist liberation war against the Soviet Union, which started in 1979. 
Back then, their primary political identity mixed anti-communism and various forms of 
political Islam. Out of this ideological past, its founders created in the 1990s a nationalist 
15
movement whose discourse adapted and became more sophisticated as time passed and 
military victories increasingly replaced the existing political structures with Taliban rule. 
This section will show not only how the fundamentalist Taliban leaders built a nationalist 
discourse to wage a guerrilla campaign in the early 1990s, but also how their ideological 
flexibility led them to incorporate jihadist and revolutionary elements in order to adapt to 
growing international hostility towards them after 1998. 
Before the Taliban Movement’s foundation in 1994, the basic nationalistic values of 
the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion’s veterans were the identification with 
Islamic faith in general and the opposition to communism, the latter understood by them as 
an immoral foreign creed. According to a publication produced by the Taliban’s office in 
New York, “Afghanistan's Jihad against communism and foreign occupation began under the 
banner of Islam. It was on the basis of the teachings of Islam that a small, ill-equipped nation 
succeeded in defeating a Super Power that seemed well-positioned to dominate the world.”30 
The future Taliban leaders, who according to the Movement’s mythology were at the time 
“students of Islamic teachings,” played a role in mobilizing, planning, and directing the war 
against the Soviets. “This role was not new to the Afghan history,” explains a Taliban 
document. “In the past, whenever a foreign power invaded Afghanistan and threatened 
freedom and independence of the Afghans, the Islamic students (taliban) left their schools or 
madrassas (Islamic schools) to fight at the head of the Afghan armies. With the Soviets gone 
in disgrace, and their puppets defeated, the taliban perceived their task accomplished, and 
soon returned back in large numbers to their madrassas, to take up their search for knowledge 
and spiritual advancement. The period described above that lasted from 1978 to 1992, can be 
 
30 “A Reminding Glimpse of the Islamic Jihad,” Taliban New York Office; Internet, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/19981206235857/www.taleban.com/jihad.htm; Accessed on 3 Oct. 2006. Also, 
Nematollah Nojumi, “The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan,” (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 180. 
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called the first phase of the taliban mission in serving their faith, their people, and their 
country.”31 The strong anti-communism of these religious students had let them galvanize 
political support among the populace and other militants against the invaders until 1992. But 
since then, with the installation of a post-communist government, it was corruption, 
ineffectiveness and the moral decadence brought about by the post-Soviet civil war that 
motivated the foundation of an alternative political project.32 
Although along with anti-communism Afghanistan’s nationalism was identified 
historically with the Islamic faith, the country has historically been religiously diverse, and 
the particular religious identity of the Taliban is a matter of scholarly discussion. Researchers 
have branded them with such terms as extremists, fundamentalists and neo-fundamentalists.33 
Sociologist Olivier Roy defines Islamism as a political interpretation of Islam whose political 
visions are not primarily based on interpretations of religious texts, but a mixture of scientific 
schools at the university level and state-run madrassas, usually sponsored by modern 
governments in the twentieth century. Fundamentalism, which he prefers to call 
Traditionalism, rejects scholar interpretations and modern adaptations of traditional Islamic 
texts.34 Evidence shows that from the very beginning the core value that defined the 
Movement and differentiated it from other Afghan factions was its pursuit of a particular 
version of Islamic purity that other groups did not offer and that characterized its own 
version of religious traditionalism. The Taliban actively rejected the brand of extremists and 
 
31 “A Reminding Glimpse of the Islamic Jihad,” internet source cited above. 
 
32 “Hostilities and Ineffectiveness of the Leaders,” Taliban New York Office; Internet, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/19981206235857/www.taleban.com/hostil.htm; Accessed on 9 Oct. 2006. 
 
33 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short Story of Its People and Politics, (New York: Perennial/Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2002), 263. 
 
34 Nabi Misdaq, Afghanistan: Political Frailty and Foreign Interference, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 146. 
17
considered its members moderates.35 “We were fighting against Muslims who had gone 
wrong,” explained the mullah Mohammed Omar, top leader of the Taliban, shortly after the 
taking over Kabul in 1996.36 As a guerrilla movement, the Taliban installed temporary rules 
over conquered territories with the goal of forcing a purification of the society, so that later 
on a new government could be restored. Omar himself, his driver explains, claimed 
legitimacy by posing as “a symbol of purity.”37 
The Taliban built its ideology around fundamentalist values and nationalism, but with 
time it expanded and refined its nationalist discourse in order to use it as a tool aimed at 
reuniting a fragmented and threatened country, promoting tribal political customs and anti-
foreign rhetoric. From its inception, the Movement claimed to answer a call made not only 
by God but by the people.38 In the early stages of its campaign, the Taliban’s idea of nation 
was more a projection of tribal experiences than anything else. But it explicitly engaged in a 
process of nation building, initially defined by a fight against foreign corrupt influences. In 
fact, the nationalist idea of “purifying” the nation from alien interference was as important as 
its self-imposed religious duty of purifying Islam in Afghanistan. A Taliban spokesman told 
the press in October 1994 that they believed in the formation of a national council of tribes, 
known as Loya Jirga, to accord peace to the country, while they concentrated on eliminating 
the Wahabbi and Salafi influence in the region. These two interpretations of Islam were 
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disliked by most of Afghans precisely as foreign creeds.39 By November 1994, Omar’s 
political project went national, as the Taliban announced intentions of taking the whole 
country in the name of Islam.40 Afghan ruin, the Movement’s discourses explained, started in 
1979 as a product of betrayal to both the Islam and the nation, while the civil war after Soviet 
withdrawal was provoked by the “non-Islamic and anti-national behavior” 41 of Afghan 
warlords. 
Corrupting foreign influences, according to the Taliban, increasingly came not only 
from Western countries but also from regional powers (and allies) like Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan, and from declared enemies like Iran. Unwanted Wahabbi influences came from the 
Saudis, the main internal enemy was identified as the “Persian-speaking government in 
Kabul”42 supported by Iran, and the Pakistanis seemed too eager to intervene in Afghan 
affairs. The Taliban’s nationalistic stances were on the rise at the same time some 
commentators started to suggest the movement had been a creation of Pakistan to protect 
political and trade interests. “Many people have claimed us as ‘theirs’,” said Mullah Omar, 
“now they say we are working for the Americans. We never said anything about these claims, 
but our objective is our country and Islam, we are in nobody’s pay. I am the leader of this 
movement and I have not met with any Pakistani or American officials.”43 Anti-Pakistani 
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comments were not rare among the Taliban, since “Afghans are proud people who do not like 
the Pakistanis always trying to run things and place the Afghans on a lower level.”44 
As the war advanced, the tribal Taliban incorporated more and more elements into its 
discourse. That helped it to forge an idea of national unity, identifying itself with one of the 
less disputed symbols of Afghan unity: the memory of the national hero and Father of the 
Nation (Baba), Ahmed Shah Durrani. “The rehabilitation of Ahmed Shah Durrani’s 
mausoleum and sprucing up an inner city monument to martyrs of the jihad show that the 
Taliban have some civic and national awareness,”45 commented the U.S. embassy in Pakistan 
in a secret memo. The prominence of Durrani in Taliban’s nationalist discourses became 
consistent in time, and by 1998 the Movement had renamed Kabul’s main square from the 
narrowly tribal “Pashtunistan square” to a more national inclusive name: “Ahmed Shah Baba 
square.”46 
Durrani was not the only symbol used by the Taliban to promote its nationalistic 
project.  Under Taliban rule, starting in 1996, the national flag was redesigned to bear an 
Islamic kalmia, the first pillar of Islam that claims the oneness of God, written in green, on an 
immaculate white background, sealing the newly regained unity of the Afghans under Islam 
and nation. The Afghan map, as presented by the new government in Kabul, depicted not an 
abstract religious community but a territorial body clearly defined by national frontiers. “The 
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Taliban took five months to capture one province but then six provinces fell to us in only ten 
days,” commented Omar in clear recognition of the historical political-administrative borders 
of the country. “Now we are in control of 22 provinces including Kabul. Inshallah (God 
willing) the whole of Afghanistan will fall into our hands.”47 In the years to come, the 
Taliban revived mass concentrations in the Kabul stadium to celebrate the Afghan 
independence from the British rule, as it was used in times before the civil war, playing with 
a national sentiment that appealed to all ethnic groups: Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras 
as well.48 
The Taliban’s ideological discourses became more important as the military gains 
forced the Movement to assume governmental duties. As part of a process of ideological 
refinement, the Taliban engaged in sophisticated propaganda. One of the most significant 
mythological stories about the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan illustrates the intertwining 
of religious and nationalist symbols in its discourse: On April 13, 1996, right after his forces 
took over Kabul and overthrew the first post-Soviet government, the Mullah Omar asked the 
keeper of a temple in Kandahar permission to see the kherqa, reputedly a piece of the Prophet 
Mohammed’s cloak. The kherqa had been trusted in the eighteenth-century to the Afghan 
hero and Father of the Afghan Nation, Ahmed Shah Durrani. After his death, it was kept in a 
mausoleum right next to his tomb. A gathering of 1,500 mullahs, a congregation not seen for 
60 years, had now been organized. Omar went out of the temple with the cloak, and reaching 
the top of one of the city’s main mosques, showed it to an ecstatic crowd, with his hands slid 
into its sleeves. The crowd of mullahs started to shout “Amir-al Muminin!,” (“Commander of 
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the Faithful”). Thereafter, Omar pursued the conquest of the rest of Afghanistan as his 
personal legitimate duty.49 
Taliban’s radicalization 
In the same way the Taliban’s ideological discourse evolved from religious ethics and 
anti-communism to a religious nationalism in the mid 1990s, it reflected a gradual political 
radicalization towards revolutionary anti-western ideas, as Omar’s men were repeatedly 
denied by the international community of the aid and recognition they craved to rebuild their 
war-devastated country and to establish a purified Islamic emirate. Between 1995 and 1998, 
the Taliban had tried to established cooperative relations with the Western powers and the 
international community. In 1995 the Taliban showed support for the United Nations 
attempts to broker a peace deal among the Afghan factions50 and, as the U.S. embassy to 
Pakistan asserted, its members “appeared well-disposed towards the United States and said 
they would welcome future visits.”51 In the words of a member, the Movement had decided 
to contact the U.S. since it was “an important and unbiased friend,”52 and it even opened a 
diplomatic office in New York. The moderation of the Taliban’s foreign policy even 
prompted it to present the country internationally not as an emirate (as it was declared by 
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Omar in 1996), but simply as the Islamic State of Afghanistan.53 But as years passed, the 
Taliban felt the financial and political pressures derived from the international denunciation 
of its widespread violations of human rights, even though it had effectively enforced one of 
the U.N.-backed international demands: the total ban of opium production. While moderate 
Taliban members gained some battles in their efforts to comply with international demands, 
the more fundamentalist within the leadership did not see many incentives to relax their tight 
grip on Afghan society. A journalist who met Omar tried to understand the reasons why the 
Taliban did not give up on Western demands such as granting more freedoms to women. “If 
we allow our women not to observe Islamic rules, would the Christian west be pleased with 
us?” asked Omar. “I said ‘no’. He then said ‘if we water down our Islamic way of life a little, 
would that please the West? I said ‘not necessarily.’ He then said ‘why should we change our 
Islamic way of life, if it does not even please the West?”54 
The attacks launched by the Saudi terrorist Osama Bin Laden against the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001, further strained relations between the Taliban and the international 
community, when the former refused to extradite Bin Laden to the U.S.  The new 
international context forced the Taliban to transform its policy and discourse to prepare itself 
for confrontation instead of outreach. “America is very strong,” acknowledged Omar days 
before the imminent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. “Even if it were twice as strong or twice 
that, it could not be strong enough to defeat us. We are confident that no one can harm us if 
God is with us.” And in the same message, revolutionary Islamic ideas seemed to mark the 
Taliban’s turn towards the international jihadism: “America controls the governments of the 
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Islamic countries. The people ask to follow Islam, but the governments do not listen because 
they are in the grip of the United States.”55 
When it returned to guerrilla warfare, the Taliban’s fundamentalist-nationalist 
discourse seemed to be downplayed by the newly incorporated revolutionary consciousness. 
“The current situation in Afghanistan is related to a bigger cause - that is the destruction of 
America,” explained Omar to the BBC. “The plan is going ahead and, God willing, it is being 
implemented. But it is a huge task, which is beyond the will and comprehension of human 
beings. If God's help is with us, this will happen within a short period of time; keep in mind 
this prediction.” 56 A report of the U.N. Secretary General to the Security Council on 
December 2001 explicitly referred to Mullah Mohammed Omar’s decrees and statements, 
highlighting the fact that they had evolved “from concern with just Afghan issues to notably 
greater support for a global jihad, as promoted by Bin Laden.”57 In 2002, Omar sustained the 
intensity of his rhetoric: “The battle [in Afghanistan] has [just] started, its fire has been 
kindled and it will engulf the White House, seat of injustice and tyranny. [The United States] 
launched a war against Islam and Muslims without any legitimate justification, and I am 
confident that God [ will grant Muslims] victory.” 58 That year, besides officially declaring a 
holy war against the U.S. and calling on all Muslims to fight on his side,59 Omar linked his 
war with those of other Islamic guerrillas. “I tell my brethren in Palestine: be patient and 
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continue your blessed struggle,” he said. “We did not forget you. We are still healing another 
wound in the Muslim nation, which is the occupation of our land by the Americans. Your 
battle and ours are one and the same."60 Researchers pointed out that as a guerrilla force, the 
Taliban entered an alliance with radical elements such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (former 
nemesis and fundamentalist Afghan warlord) and Al Qaeda, pushing for more radicalization 
among the Taliban and putting “more stress on ideology.”61 As an observer put it in 2005, 
Afghanistan was a battlefield of nationalistic and religious propaganda war.62 By the summer 
2006, Omar claimed to have large territories in southern Afghanistan back under his control. 
In a recorded message, he defiantly asserted that “my government has collapsed but I am still 
here and my army is still intact and we are resisting our enemies inside Afghanistan.” 
Threatening the new U.S.-supported government in Afghanistan, he warned: “Don't forget 
what happened to the Russian army in Afghanistan. You cannot impose the ideas of 
foreigners in the country of pure Muslims.” 
In the 1980s, when many of the future Taliban leaders fought alongside other 
mujahideen against communists and Soviet troops, anti-communism and Islamic doctrines 
served as catalysts to develop a sense of national unity around the ideals of pushing back the 
“atheists” and invaders of Afghan soil. In the early 1990s, the Taliban organized itself around 
a new discourse that offered to purify the Islamic practices in Afghanistan and to fight back 
against corrupt Muslims. These ideals, based on a fundamentalist religious ethic, were 
quickly projected into a nationalistic project that advanced and grew more consistent along 
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with the Taliban’s military gains. Finally in the late 1990s, the Taliban adapted its ideological 
discourse, which up to then had focused on the internal enemy, to position the Movement in 
strategic opposition to the United States and in alliance with anti-Western jihadist and 
revolutionary elements. 
So far, I have shown how the Taliban defined itself with a nationalist-fundamentalist 
ideology built upon the core value of purity. The next section will explore the case of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, where Laurent Désiré Kabila led a revolutionary struggle 
that lasted four decades, in which he consistently advanced a nationalistic discourse inspired 
by the Soviet and Chinese communist models. 
 
D.R. Congo: Vision of an African China
Laurent Désiré Kabila was born in Congo while it was a Belgian colonial territory, 
studied political philosophy in France, was enrolled in the University of Dar es Salaam in 
Tanzania, and returned to his native land, the secessionist Katanga, turned in 1960 into a 
province of the newly independent Republic of Congo. From there he took a revolutionary 
path that led him through North Korea, East Germany, Yugoslavia, China and back to a 
country soon renamed Zaire.63 Even though he was a heavily indoctrinated and committed 
communist, one of his major lifetime obsessions was to create a coherent sense of nation for 
his countrymen. This section will provide evidence of Kabila’s life-time commitment to 
nationalist and socialist ideals, and will explain how he applied them to his own 
revolutionary organization and the administration of a reduced socialist enclave in 
Southeastern Zaire, even when little hope of insurgent victory was in sight.  
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During a revolutionary period covering the years from 1964 to the late 1980s, the 
core of Kabila’s ideological discourse combined his admiration to the Chinese-style 
socialism with and outright opposition to Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and his 
nationalist campaign known as Authenticité (Authenticity). Kabila’s ability to adapt his 
socialist-nationalist discourse in the early post-Cold War, stressing his nationalist anti-
Mobutist component and downplaying his socialist rhetoric, enabled him to galvanize nation-
wide support as the leader of an armed insurrection that put him in power in 1996, when his 
truly ideological commitment to socialism became once again overt. So far, Kabila’s 
recognition as a truly committed revolutionary socialist in the 1990s and up to 2001 has been 
historically contested, as many scholars have assumed he never was deeply committed to 
ideology. Some authors conclude that he actually retired from his revolutionary career by the 
late 1960s and dedicated himself full-time to cross border trading of gold and ivory.64 Such 
scholars interpret his socialist-nationalist discourse after 1996 as an opportunistic move to 
favor his economic and power ambitions. In order to support the argument that Kabila had 
been a truly committed socialist, this section will examine his credentials as revolutionary in 
the period from 1964 to 1996. 
Although in the late 1960s most armed insurgencies had been discredited in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, then known as Zaire, as relevant political forces in the 
country, due to their almost complete military defeat by Mobutu’s army, Kabila persisted in 
the construction of a Soviet-and-Maoist-inspired society. Back then, a young Laurent Kabila 
found himself at the head of a small armed socialist group known as the Parti pour la 
Révolution des Peuples (PRP), founded four years before to engage in low intensity guerrilla 
 
64 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo From Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History, (London: Zed Books, 
2002), 135; also Kevin C. Dunn, “A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the 
Son,” in The African Stakes of the Congo War, John F. Clark ed. (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2002), 54. 
27
warfare against Mobutu’s government. Since 1967, this group had established itself in the 
Sud Kivu province, north of his homeland, between the towns of Fizi and Baraka, where they 
established an autonomous rule financed, among other sources, by illegal trade across the 
border with Tanzania. The nature of his rule in the Fizi-Baraka area is a matter of discussion. 
Some historians conclude that at that point Kabila had decided to drop his revolutionary 
commitment, which in any case had never been very great,65 and turned to self-enrichment. 
On the contrary, Marxist historian Ludo Martens argues that in 1967 Kabila had just returned 
from a period of political-military training in China, returning to his country as a renewed 
revolutionary, more committed than ever to create a Marxism-inspired society. “The Kabila 
that returns in Kivu in October 1967 is a man completely transformed by his six months of 
political-military training in China”. 66 According to his account, Kabila met a warm 
reception in the Fizi area precisely “because of its political speech”. 67 Citing a witness of 
those years, he explains that “Kabila and his men came without money, but they had clear 
and right political ideas’”68 In October 1967, Kabila officially launched his socialist 
republic.69 
Descriptions offered by scholars and members of Kabila’s mini-State in southeastern 
Zaire provide evidence that he tried to create a Chinese-style society, and not merely an 
authoritarian economically-driven regime. Kabila’s detractors throw these claims into doubt 
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on the basis of evidence showing that the economic base of the mini-State was the cross-
border illegal trade in gold, ivory, leopard skins and timber to be sold in neighboring 
Tanzania and Burundi, and concluding that these activities should have provided him with 
considerable wealth. Sifa Maanya, Kabila’s wife and mother of Joseph (later successor to his 
father as D.R. Congo ‘s president), describes the contrary: a desperate economic situation 
that pushed them towards illegal activities, even the kidnapping of three Stanford students, 
for survival’s sake.70 But even though her account may not be accurate, and the rebels could 
have been economically well-off, evidence shows that the Fizi State was a political 
experiment modeled after Maoist examples that privileged the leader’s grip. In the complex 
political structure created by Kabila, he was regarded as “Founder and President of the PRP, 
President of the Republic, Supreme Commander of People’s Armed Forces, President of the 
National Assembly, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs as well as President of the 
Revolutionary Military Commission”.71 The PRP set an independent administration, while an 
armed wing, the Forces Armées Populaires (FAP), continued to attack governmental 
positions, extort from the local population, and protect the illegal trade activities that 
financed Kabila’s mini-state.72 The rule over the Fizi and Baraka population was, 
theoretically, in the hands of a Revolutionary Civil Administration led by another party 
member, Malaka Baudouin. From the beginning, the PRP implemented a comprehensive plan 
of military, social and economic indoctrination for his men and newly recruited members of 
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the PRP.73 According to Sifa Maanya’s description of their life in the late 1960s: “we held 
meetings with people of our class, and explained them why it was necessary to fight this 
dictatorship which crushed the peasants. In the maquis, we practiced further education, each 
one was to follow training in political courses, but also to learn how to read and write. The 
political sessions themselves were given in seven days, and then those who had been re-
educated were sent to other villages to teach in their turn.”74 
The political nature of Kabila’s experiment was not merely complementary to its 
economic activities, as he devoted a great effort to political-military activities aimed at 
sparking a national revolution. Far from being isolated in the remote Congolese mountains, 
Kabila counted on valuable contacts with other guerrilla leaders in the region such as 
Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, 75 who became presidents of their 
respective countries later on. In Belgium, Kabila established closed relations with the Marxist 
scholar and politician Ludo Martens, who in November 1979 invited him to speak to the 
Maoist Workers Party of Belgium, today renamed PVDA-PTB.76 Along with his political 
work in the Fizi area and abroad, Kabila prepared military operations. Between 1984 and 
1985, his mini-State’s armed forces, the FAP, escalated their operations and briefly seized 
the port of Moba, before being driven off by Mobutu’s army.77 Kabila’s gamble resulted in 
failure. Instead of sparking a wave of resistance against the government it attracted official 
military pressure that led the mini-State to a collapse in around 1988.  
 
73 Afoaku, 127. 
 
74 “Mama Sifa, la Mère du Président Joseph Kabila, Parle de Son Fils,” internet source cited above. 
 
75 Afoaku, 134. 
 
76 “Ludo Martens : 3.500.000 Morts au Congo, un Génocide dans l'Indifférence Totale. Pourquoi?,” Digital 
Congo, 9 May. 2001; Internet, available at http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/1928; Accessed on 17 Nov. 2006. 
77 Historical Dictionary of Democratic Republic of the Congo, 212. 
30
Evidence has shown so far that between 1964 and the late 1980s Kabila consistently 
advanced a political project of national reach to build a socialist State on the Chinese model. 
Between 1989 and 1991, with the fall of the communist regimes in the Soviet-bloc, an 
ideological crisis spread among revolutionary insurgencies worldwide, and Kabila’s reduced 
group was no exception. However, at the end of this section I will show how his socialist 
discourse was toned down in the early 1990s as his nationalist anti-Mobutist identity 
remained at the forefront, and how that discourse helped him to galvanize political and 
military support that resuscitated his revolutionary plans. Evidence suggests that he 
succeeded in projecting himself as a credible nationalist anti-Mobutist leader to head the 
various armed rebellions that erupted against the government in the 1990s. Once in power, 
however, he turned back to his hardcore socialist discourse. 
The 1991 political process opened by Mobutu’s regime, which was weakened after 
political and economic support from Western countries receded at the end of the Cold War, 
re-ignited Kabila’s hopes of a national armed revolution. In July 1992, Kabila’s PRP 
convened a National Conference in Madrid to delineate a post-Mobutu government,78 
arguing the need for an arms-driven change. In 1993, Kabila reaffirmed that “only an 
external revolution against the mobutist political tradition will liberate us all.”79 Perceived 
failures in the political transition process initiated and controlled by Mobutu encouraged 
other factions to take up arms to overthrow Mobutu as well. With the support of neighboring 
countries, such as Rwanda and Uganda, that foresaw economic and political opportunities of 
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a regime change, Kabila’s and three other rebel forces joined in 1995 an umbrella 
organization called Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre 
(AFDL), based on the common nationalist impulse to overthrow Mobutu. Some researchers 
have questioned the political coherence of the ADFL, and suggested that its creation was 
merely a cover for a Rwandan invasion, pointing to the fact that it was created in October 
1996, in Sud Kivu, nearly two months after Rwanda had already sent troops into Zaire.80 The 
view of the ADFL as a foreign creation was reinforced by a famous interview given by then 
Rwandan vice-president Paul Kagame to The Washington Post, in July 9, 1997, in which he 
took credit for starting the rebellion against Mobutu.81 Supporters of this argument insist that 
contrary to Kabila’s claims of preparing a military campaign since 1995, he “was summoned 
to a rebellion in motion he declared to lead”.82 
But independently of the origins and political incoherence of the 1996 rebellion, 
Kabila succeeded in presenting the ADFL as an indigenous movement fighting a corrupted 
dictatorship. His nationalist and anti-Mobutist past served as credentials to allow him to 
present himself as its leader.83 “Zairians began to accept Kabila due to his rhetorical claims 
of historical legitimacy as rebel leader, their own desire to be ‘liberated’, and the dawning 
realization that Mobutu’s days were numbered,” wrote a commentator.84 Throughout his 
revolutionary career, Kabila stressed his past as a combatant under nationalist and socialist 
figures Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele to project himself as their anti-Mobutist heir. 
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“Lumumbism is doctrine, while Mulelism is a force,” was the usual re-interpretation of these 
historical leaders by Kabilist authors who since the 1980s have pointed to Kabila as a 
continuer of the epic of national liberation.85 This discourse proved effective to justify his 
leadership within the ADFL and later as head of the country.86 By 1996, the widespread 
hatred of Mobutu’s rule helped to galvanize the fragmented armed opposition that, besides a 
change of government, did not share a common vision of a post-Mobutu nation. Some ADFL 
fighters, a researcher says, “thought they were fighting for the overthrow of capitalism, some 
for the survival of Zaire’s Tutsi community, some for the end of Mobutu.”87 Popular support 
for the rebellion grew as people foresaw an end to the horrors and abuses of Mobutu’s 
regime.88 The ADFL was not marked by its coherence. Disunion and internal rebellions led 
Mai Mai warriors to end up attacking Tutsi soldiers, and many gave themselves over to 
looting and violence as they headed towards Kinshasa. 89 Since October 1996, starting its 
armed uprising in Sud Kivu initially to protect the Banyamulenge population from the Hutu’s 
militias, the ADFL required only eight months to take control of the country. 90 It was a war 
Mobutu’s Zairians soldiers seemed unwilling to fight. Researcher Michela Wrong says “it 
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became clear this was a war in which very little actual fighting was going on.” 91 With the 
direct support of Rwanda and Uganda, and complacency from France and the U.S.,92 the 
ADFL campaign convinced the Zairians that the Mobutu’s years had come to an end, and as 
a result, as both critics and scholars acknowledged, Kabila’s popularity soared.93 Human 
rights abuses and massacres were ignored by his foreign backers, while he argued that such a 
war of liberation required sacrifices and killings.94 The triumphal entrance of Kabila to 
Kinshasa on May 20, 1997, after Mobutu’s escape, signaled the end of an armed struggle and 
the beginning of a revolutionary process that Kabila’s main allies in the ADFL’s leadership 
may not have foreseen. 
In 1996, using a Marxist analysis, Kabila explained his military victory as an uprising 
of an oppressed population. A local scholar explains that “After decades of suffering, 
deprivation, the denial of their human and political rights, the plunder of their resources, the 
Congolese people had risen up in arms to win to their victory over Mobutu dictatorship.” 95 
After military victory, as Mao taught, purification of the country’s new leadership should 
follow to ensure that the revolution would go on. Every anti-Mobutist was invited to join, but 
every counter-revolutionary had to be purged immediately. As a result, Kabila’s first policies 
intended to transform the nationalist ADFL into a truly vanguard party, in Lenin’s tradition, 
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one that should lead the country towards socialism and the creation of a regional superpower: 
an African China. Therefore, a violent period of political repression accompanied the 
Kabila’s early rule. “Continuers of the Second Republic,” Kabila explained, “had to be 
ejected from leading posts of the movement to save the democratic revolution.”96 A Maoist-
Stalinist model of state, centered in a supreme leader, had been conceived and implemented 
by Kabila since his Fizi years, and since 1996 would be replicated at national level.  
A loose but effective national liberation discourse enabled the ADFL to rally the 
military and popular support necessary to overthrow Mobutu’s regime. But in Kabila’s mind 
nationalism was only the emotional component of a core ideology to which he had been 
committed for more than forty years. While his effectiveness as revolutionary has been 
historically put into question, and his 1996 victory explained as a result of his opportunism, 
the consistency of his ideological discourse kept alive his insurgent ideals long after the end 
of the Cold War, up to his death in 2001. 
In this chapter, I have shown how the Taliban’s vision of a pure Islamic society and 
Kabila’s dream of turning his country into an African China were mixed in both cases with 
an emotionally compelling nationalist discourse to successfully rally support and give armed 
insurgents a sense of mission. In the last section, I will present the case of the Marxist-
Leninist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), whose socialist discourse from 
the 1960s increasingly incorporated nationalist elements in order to help it to survive the 
ideological crisis brought by the end of the Soviet Union and the new international context of 
the post-Cold War. 
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Colombia: From Revolution to Re-Foundational Epic
After 1991, scholars and researchers of the Colombian internal armed conflict, which 
dates from at least 1964, have tended to dismiss traces of a truly socialist commitment within 
the leadership of the main guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-
People’s Army (FARC-EP), even suggesting its slow degradation towards a rent-seeking 
criminal organization.97 Authors like Román D. Ortiz have argued that given the general 
discredit of Marxist-Leninist discourses in the post-Cold War, the FARC’s discourse has 
focused since then on promising not a socialist state but a “good government,” “sidelining 
any dogma that promises the achievement of some utopia, and giving way to a purely 
pragmatic strategy for gaining power.”98 Contrary to these interpretations of the FARC as an 
almost de-ideologized guerilla group, I will present evidence of first how the FARC 
consistently advanced a political-military socialist project across the 1990s based on socialist 
and Marxist-Leninist principles. To do so, it made use of a nationalist and pan-regionalist 
discourse based on the national independence hero Simón Bolívar. 
After the demise of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
FARC’s Marxist-Leninist discourse challenged those opinions regarding it as obsolete. 
Interviewed by an Argentinean leftist organization, a FARC spokesman acknowledged the 
ideological crisis brought by the end of the Soviet Union. “The fall of the [Berlin] wall wasn't 
a defeat for communism or socialism, but a defeat for a type of socialist model. At that 
moment we were left politically isolated, because of that, we were branded as dinosaurs and 
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that sort of thing. Today, time and facts prove us right. Socialism is more vigorous than ever, 
and this is the only real choice humankind has.”99 At the end of the twentieth century, 
Marxist analysis continued to be applied, and the FARC continued to explain the Colombian 
armed conflict as a product of the “class struggle” and its existence as an expression of the 
“proletariat class’ interests.”100 Explicitly, the FARC considered the post-Cold War era a 
time in which an ideological confrontation was still being fought, denouncing ‘neo-liberal 
ideologies’ for trying to “erase the question of class struggle” and “deny the existence of 
imperialism.”101 
The FARC leadership explained that “bourgeois ideologues and the mass media at the 
service of big capital” engaged since the fall of the Soviet Union in a campaign to erode 
revolutionary struggle by convincing people that armed revolution was not feasible and there 
was no alternative to capitalism. The military, it said, wanted to win the war “from the desks 
and through the media.”102 Far from considering it an isolationist path, the FARC insisted on 
socialism as a live ideology with a place in the post-Cold War world. Proudly, an 
indoctrinated young guerrilla denied the demise of worldwide socialism: “We are Marxist-
Leninists. This implies that we are internationalists first of all. We are for the socialist 
revolution on a world level that progresses toward communism.”103 For the FARC’s 
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leadership, socialism is more than feasible; the new set of economic and political 
opportunities brought about by the globalization process, instead of suffocating their 
revolution, “has been bringing possibilities for that transition closer.”104 
But in spite of its re-invigorated commitment to socialism since the 1990s, the 
FARC’s discourse has made great efforts to distance itself from socialist political models 
prevalent in the Cold War years, while its proposed alternative remains diffuse, flexible and 
adaptable. In its words, a “Colombian style socialism” will supposedly draw on various 
models.105 But so far it remains a system “yet to be decided,” one dependent “on which social 
sectors will accompany us in this process towards taking power”.106 But defining itself as a 
Marxist-Leninist organization, the FARC has made particular efforts to detach itself from the 
Soviet example and, presumably, the Soviet fate. According to its discourse, socialism did 
not fail there: the Soviet leadership failed because it was not ideologically flexible enough. 
“One of the greatest problems faced by socialism in the USSR was that the theory became 
dogma,” explained a FARC spokeswoman. “Lenin’s writings on the organization of the party 
were misinterpreted, leading many communist parties to become dictatorial, bureaucratic or 
corrupt. These leaders misinterpreted support for the people as state paternalism, which 
meant that in the end no-one valued what they had. This generated numerous problems, like 
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poor production and distribution of domestic goods and ignoring the wishes of the population. 
And it did not work.”107 
Distancing itself from failed communist experiments forced the FARC to rely on 
principles rather than on commitments to a particular form of State, social justice being its 
core principle. The FARC’s socialist principles are encompassed in its “Guerrilla Fighters’ 
Agrarian Program,” which dates from the Cold War years, and the ‘Ten-point Platform’ 
approved in the VIII FARC-EP’s Conference of 1993, re-adjusted in 2000 and in the IX 
Conference of 2007.108 But none of these describe a radically new State structure. In fact, in 
the 1990s the FARC did not propose to install a full Leninist or Stalinist model, but 
constitutional-level changes making the Congress unicameral or democratizing the judiciary 
branch.109 A concrete reform would be agreed after a peace settlement with the Colombian 
State and the establishment of “a government of national convergence and a government of 
national reconstruction and reconciliation” that would discuss FARC’s proposals. 110 
The FARC’s post Cold War Socialism is characterized by a redefinition of the role of 
the State and a strategic opposition to economic imperialism. Since 1993, the FARC has 
explicitly proposed that “the State must be the main owner and administrator in the strategic 
sectors: energy, communications, public services, roads, ports and natural resources.”111 The 
FARC’s proposed State would control some key sectors of the economy not directly linked 
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with production,112 and would assume basic welfare responsibilities such as providing 
“health, housing, education and drinkable water,” and the execution of “an agrarian policy 
directed against the large estate and the colonial remnants in some sectors of our 
countryside.”113 Unlike the Soviet case, according to one FARC spokeswoman, the State 
should oversee fundamental strategies but not control production, “because this ends up with 
control over everything and then nothing works.”114 The anti-imperialist component of 
FARC’s socialism is reflected in the State’s duties to restrict the participation of foreign 
firms in the exploitation of natural and biological resources, to renounce the “un-payable” 
external debt, and to turn Colombia into a more self-sufficient food producer, in order reduce 
dependency on those who control the international markets and exert “imperialism.”115 
Socialism should not isolate the Colombian economy from the rest of the world. “We are not 
opposed to international trade. We are opposed, though, to international exploitation, which 
is called ‘trade,’”116 explained spokesman Marcos Calarcá.  
The FARC’s ideological discourse in the late 1980s and early 1990s was designed to 
revitalize the group’s identity around Marxist-Leninist and other socialist principles, as an 
expression of a core value: social justice. However, the need to adapt its ideological platform 
to a decade of global skepticism towards revolutionary socialism pushed the FARC to use 
more prominently a nationalist element previously underdeveloped in its discourse. After 
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1993, the FARC redefined the vision it had of itself, not denying Marxist-Leninist principles, 
but adding our Liberator Simon Bolivar’s thought, and all the Latin American revolutionary 
thought.”117 Making use of the figure of historical hero Simón Bolívar, revered in five 
countries as a major leader during the successful independence wars from Spain between 
1810 and 1830, the FARC opted for decisively integrating a nationalist element to its 
socialist revolution. “We have never denied we are a Marxist-Leninist organization,” said a 
FARC leader in 2004. “In the FARC, a squadron is composed of 12 men or women, and 
that’s a cell of the Communist Party, and there we educate our combatants in all Marxist-
Leninist thought. We believe that position is far from outdated. Besides, we added Bolivarian 
thought to Marxism, because we think Bolivar has a lot to do in Latin America.”118 
The FARC’s Bolivarianism in the post-Cold War period served not to place the 
organization historically in times of crisis, but also to connect with the anti-imperialist 
movement that sprang-up around the globe in the 1990s. The figure of Simón Bolívar had 
undergone a particular re-creation by Marxist authors since the 1920s, and the FARC, as well 
as other insurgent groups in Colombia and Venezuela, made use of it during the twentieth-
century to position their revolution in a historical perspective. In the 1990s Bolívar became a 
crucial ideological element that defined the FARC’s identity. The Bolívar recreated by the 
FARC is a popular hero, and his war, an inconclusive bourgeois anti-colonial revolution. 
Represented as the antithesis of other Colombian aristocratic leaders such as Francisco de 
Paula Santander, Bolívar has been reconfigured as a class-conscious bourgeois who 
understood the unjust colonial economic system of production as a legitimate motive for 
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insurrection.119 On an international level, Bolívar is a useful face to show, because socialist 
Latin Americans consider him a champion of anti-imperialism, underlining his distrust of 
(and downplaying his admiration for) the United States model. “Against imperialism, for the 
fatherland! Against the oligarchy, for the people! Long live the Bolivarian Movement for the 
New Colombia!”120 FARC’s documents often concluded after 1997. According to Raúl 
Reyes, one of FARC’s top leaders, “the FARC is a political-military organization, of 
Marxist-Leninist inception, fed by the emancipatory, anti-imperialist, integrationist and 
libertarian thought of the Liberator Simón Bolívar.”121 The FARC used the “anti-imperialist” 
Bolívar to click with anti-globalization movements that sprang up in the 1990 all over the 
world, arguing that Colombia was a victim of U.S. imperialism, particularly of U.S. aid to the 
Colombian government’s military forces, which were directed against the FARC.122 The 
guerilla group’s international messages called for world solidarity based on the common anti-
imperialist platform, reaching out to the Iraqi and Palestinian peoples in the Middle East; 
Africans, Asians and Europeans in general; and particularly Cubans, Venezuelans, Brazilians, 
Bolivians, Ecuadorians, Salvadorians, Peruvians, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Argentineans 
and Chileans in Latin America.123 
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With its reinvigorated Marxist-Leninist commitment, the FARC has demonstrated a 
consistent ideological effort to complement its military and logistical concerns and has 
adapted to a post-Cold War scenario by deploying nationalist Bolivarianism. After three 
decades of trying to attract supporters to its socialist agenda, the FARC reacted to its political 
isolation after 1991 by calling on regional solidarity and national support from groups and 
individuals not necessarily attracted to Soviet-style socialism, but willing to contribute to a 
diffuse anti-imperialist agenda. 
 
*** 
 
In sum, insurgencies in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Colombia consistently advanced ideological discourses, recreated according to the changing 
contexts of the post-Cold War. Ideologies played a major role in the identity and strategy of 
armed insurgencies prolonged throughout the 1990s and into to the early twentieth-first 
century. Among post-Cold War ideologies, three seem to play the most relevant role along 
armed insurgencies: religious fundamentalism, nationalism and socialism, though they differ 
from their Cold War versions in their capacity to be mixed and adapted, unconstrained by 
theoretical frameworks.  However, I will argue that ideologies play more than simply a 
discursive and rhetoric role; they are a decisive component of the rebels’ political-military 
effort.  In the second chapter, I will examine how each of the insurgent organizations cited in 
this paper put into practice its ideological precepts at the organizational level, and how its 
strategies were guided by ideological principles. 
CHAPTER III 
THE TANGIBLE EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGIES 
 
The consistent advancement of an ideologically-driven discourse throughout long 
periods of time, as evidenced in the first chapter, suggests the existence of a relevant political 
component within the examined insurgent organizations, which marks a difference with other 
types of organized violence. Rebel discourses show a great degree of flexibility and 
adaptability, reaching out to various groups and changing as political contexts evolve. This 
chapter will elaborate on the function of ideologies within the overall insurgent strategy, 
beyond a rhetorical-discursive level, and on the tangible strategic and tactical results the 
insurgents seek to obtain through ideological warfare.  
First, this chapter will demonstrate how ideologies affect the organic structure of the 
rebel forces and heavily influence their political decisions. Far from considering ideological 
discourse as a non-central component aimed at adding some political gains to their core war 
strategy -particularly to legitimize their violent means-, the insurgencies here examined take 
the political implications of their discourse very seriously. As a result, both the bureaucratic 
distribution of power within their organizations and the political structures they create to 
establish control over the communities under their influence are modeled after ideological 
patterns. Secondly, this chapter will provide evidence that suggests the effectiveness of 
ideological tools for the achievement of concrete shorter term tactical results. 
45
Not only do ideologies determine the rebels’ structures and strategic agenda for the 
long run; they also serve short-term tactical purposes that let the insurgents sustain or 
escalate their wars. In other words, the subject of this chapter is insurgent ideology in 
practice. 
 
The Taliban’s Revival of the Past
In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s nationalist-fundamentalist ideology served it in military 
terms to create an army characterized by superior discipline when compared to those of the 
other Afghan factions in the civil war, thereby gaining the respect of the masses. Ideology 
provided a model of indigenous State structure and a government style that enforced the 
Taliban’s values in Afghanistan’s day life. The Taliban’s inability to put an end to the 
Afghan civil war, I will argue, can be blamed on an internal contradiction within its 
nationalist project. 
In Afghanistan, the Taliban Movement organized itself initially as a purifying force 
aimed at restoring the peace and security that Afghan warlords had not been able to provide 
after the end of their nationalist war against the Soviets in 1989. There is no scholarly 
consensus, though, on how much the Taliban’s indoctrination must be regarded as the source 
of its discipline or popularity. The Taliban’s origins and motivations have been explained in 
less-than-idealistic terms by outsiders, exposing its use of large sums of money to bribe and 
buy off warlords.124 Transport mafias, it has been said, aided and encouraged the Taliban to 
defeat the onerous illegal tax collectors imposed by warlords on the country’s main roads.125 
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And at its inception, the Taliban was accused of receiving logistical and financial support 
from Pakistan’s intelligence services and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam political party, as well 
as from Saudi donors and even indirectly from the United States.126 But even if the Taliban 
made use of money’s power of persuasion, that does not explain the popular welcome of its 
rule. Its ideology, if not fully convincing, had to be at least acceptable to the masses.127 Given 
the impossibility of keeping military forces all over the country to control population, 
insurgents had to rely on popular submission in order to control newly conquered territories. 
“They are not in a position to station Taliban soldiers in every village in the country”, wrote a 
commentator. “They could only take a place with the cooperation of the local people”.128 
And at the height of its power, the Taliban conquered around 90 percent of the country. 
The rapid rate of growth of the Taliban movement between 1994 and 1996 and the 
lack of resistance from people falling under its control are direct consequences of its success 
in conveying a credible political message. The message was that the Taliban was different 
from other warring factions and was truly committed to enforce Islamic ethical behaviors. 
According to U.S. sources in 1994 Pakistan, the Taliban “appear to enjoy the open 
admiration of most Afghans for taking action against extortionist party commanders and 
unresponsive party leadership. A number of Afghan political opportunists and has-beens are 
flocking to the Taliban in hopes of resuscitating moribund political careers. The strong 
support the Taliban receive from the Afghan people reflects popular frustration with the party 
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leaders and a strong desire for peace and stability”.129 Politically, the guerrilla force quickly 
arose among the Afghan population as a credible alternative force of order, as opposed to 
selfish and uncontrolled troops. Omar presented himself as a real alternative to the power-
hungry and ruthless warlords. Even though many people resented the strict legal codes 
implemented by the Taliban, most were happy to see its members’ discipline and restraint, 
compared to the pillage, destruction and rape to which other local militias had accustomed 
them. 130 The Taliban’s strict codes prohibited fighters from looting, although exceptions 
occurred. Overall, it was clear that the Taliban fighters were subject to the strictest 
discipline131 and definitively appeared “orderly and much more disciplined than the other 
Afghan factions.”132 An American witness to the Taliban takeover of Herat in 1996 
characterized its troops, which he estimated at between 3,000-4,000, as “extremely well 
behaved. The Taliban appeared to have plenty of money, and insisted on paying for their 
purchases, which were not lavish: mostly grapes, watermelons and bread. They politely 
refused offers of hospitality from the Herati merchants, saying that they had orders to take 
only what they paid for.” He noted that the Taliban members did not act as ‘occupiers’ and 
suggested that the Taliban discipline “derived from draconian justice imposed by their 
leaders.”133 On the contrary, at early stages of the Herati battle, local troops were 
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emboldened by their initial success against the Taliban and poured “in the search of loot”.134 
In a matter of days, the Taliban finally returned to oust them. A 1997 report in the British 
Daily Telegraph pictured the popular embracing of the Taliban: “One reason the Taliban 
swept through two-thirds of Afghanistan so quickly is that they did not pillage. Refugees 
from areas seized by Ahmed Shah Massoud’s forces135 have confirmed their reputation as 
robbers and looters. An old man who fled his home in the city of Charikar spat in disgust. 
‘They did not even leave one needle in our homes. If the Taliban comes again, I will even 
obey their donkey’… The prospect of liberation by Ahmed Shah Massoud has not filled the 
people of Kabul with joy. A significant number would rather remain under the yoke of the 
Taliban, simply because, as the single strongest force in the country they represent the best 
chance for peace.”136 
In military terms, the Taliban discipline translated into a more consistent willingness 
to sacrifice, not only for the sake of the movement itself, but for the ideological implications. 
Since 1984, madrassas offered both ideological and military training to hundreds of young 
boys who supplied the Islamist fronts.137 And during the 1990s, prospective Taliban recruits 
were trained to be part of a political-religious project in which they were basically offered 
glory and battlefield martyrdom. The ideological training in the madrassas was intrinsically 
linked with the military. “Most of these young students felt obligated to continue the path of 
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those martyred in the war. At the school, attendance in the armed struggle had also been 
preached as a religious duty. Thus, these students received military training when they were 
in religious services for the local mujahideen groups in Afghanistan. In this regard, the 
military training became a regular part of the curriculum of these religious schools”.138 In the 
words of a young Taliban fighter about the battle for Kabul in 1996, “we plunge ourselves 
wave after wave until we have humbled the enemy”139.
The National Project 
While the Taliban’s indoctrination into values of purity and order provided it with 
tactical gains of recruitment and popular acceptance, its growingly nationalist discourse 
enabled it to build a credible political vision that ensured the transition of the organization 
from tribal force to national government. But some scholars do not agree that the Taliban had 
a political ideology. Others have even refused to talk about a Taliban State, alleging that they 
did not address any State function beyond the monopoly of violence.140 But in fact, the 
Taliban not only developed a nationalist discourse as it evolved from a tribal movement into 
a national liberation guerrilla group. It also instituted a political system based on its own 
recreation of the Afghan past, which traditionally merged religious and other practices as 
sources of political order.  
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The Taliban’s vision of the State that emerged from its nationalist-fundamentalist 
ideology meant literally a return to the past, to the historical traditions, particularly to the 
Afghanistan of Ahmed Shah Durrani in the seventeenth-century. Since the birth of the 
Afghan nation in the 1700s, it had been ruled mainly by a succession of “amirs”, a religious 
title conceded to the head of government in a particular territory or “dawlat”. The amirs are 
technically protectors of individual sections of a great unity, the Ummah, which is led by 
caliphs.141 This cosmology made Islam compatible with the emergence of a limited territorial 
unity called Afghanistan, which has been regarded as a nation by the Afghan people since the 
eighteenth century. Under that logic, in October 1997 the Taliban, which had ousted the 
Kabul government of Burhanuddin Rabbani the previous year, renamed the country from 
Islamic State of Afghanistan to Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.142 Tribal pashtu values and 
styles of government that could be traced back to Ahmed Shah Durrani, the Father of the 
Nation, guided Mullah Omar’s rule. The leader of the Taliban, entitled “Commander of the 
Faithful” since 1996, used to leave his heavily guarded compound and showy vehicle caravan 
to get on a cheap motorcycle and mix with the common folks to learn of their problems, and 
in no few cases, provide them with needed military or civil hardware. “He wanted to know 
their problems, to see if they were being treated well by the Taliban," revealed Omar’s driver 
Qari Saheb.143 Precisely his effort at micromanagement of daily life, as opposed to macro 
projects appropriate for a State administrator, clearly show the imprint of tribal and religious 
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values of pashtu religious students.144 During his rule, Durrani established a government 
whose main body was a council of nine Afghan chiefs “who shared the responsibility of 
decisions but left all real authority with the young king”. 145 Following that model, Omar’s 
Taliban initially created a provisional authority based on an eight-member Kandahari High 
Shura (council) and a 22-member lower shura, composed of religious students (maulavis and 
mullahs), with Omar as the ultimate authority. The shuras used to summon tribal elders, 
ulema, military commanders and governors to coordinate important decisions. Later on, after 
ousting the previous regime, the Taliban’s State became more complex and in 1999 Omar 
ordered the formation of “hundreds of Islamic councils to supervise judicial and 
administrative affairs in the provinces”.146 
While the Taliban’s nationalism reorganized the State according to a tribal-historical 
tradition inspired by the Durrani rule, the style of government was informed by the Prophet 
Mohammed’s reign of the seventh-century. As “Commander of the Faithful,” Mullah Omar 
convinced himself that the Taliban would return Afghanistan to a golden era of pious society. 
He viewed his own role as that of rightful successor to the Prophet in Afghan lands, a role 
reinforced with symbols like his personal use of perfume believed to be the same as 
Mohammed’s. 147 In spite of its rebuilding efforts, the Taliban government made clear that 
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material progress would come second in importance of spiritual progress; Its rejection to 
mass consumer society and its Department of Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue 
corresponded to its own definition of development. 148 Given its zeal for doctrinal purity, and 
contrary to the general perception, the Taliban, as a students’ movement, placed great 
importance on general education. Its members wanted to reinstate a carefully redesigned 
educational system when they could guarantee it would be free from what they considered 
corrupting influences.149 Before they could institute a formal system of education, the 
Taliban relied on the practices of Mohammed’s empire, available to them through Muslim 
written tradition. In addition, Taliban officers revived public executions as an exemplary 
measure to educate society in virtue. “Thirty-thousand men and boys poured into the 
dilapidated Olympic sports stadium in Kabul, capital of Afghanistan. Street hawkers peddled 
nuts, biscuits and tea to the waiting crowd. The scheduled entertainment? They were there to 
see a young woman, Sohaila, receive 100 lashes, and to watch two thieves have their right 
hands amputated. Sohaila had been arrested for walking with a man who was not a relative, a 
sufficient crime for her to be found guilty of adultery. Since she was single, the crime was 
punishable by flogging; had she been married, she would have been publicly stoned to 
death.”150 In Kandahar, on February 28, 1998, three men accused of sodomy who were 
sentenced to die were put against a wall, and then a bulldozer tore it down over them. One 
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man reportedly survived and was set free. This “bizarre and labor-intensive form of 
execution” was attended by Omar, to whom was attributed the punishment that a 
contemporary of Prophet Mohammed recommended for this crime.151 
The logic of the Taliban government is not only evidence of its commitment to a 
Fundamentalist ideology but also of its nationalist project, since it is not possible to 
understand the Taliban’s particular interpretation of a “pure” Islamic society without 
acknowledging the way tribal custumes historically shaped it. The acceptance of mullahs and 
ulama as legitimate legal arbiters, the harsh punishments for adultery and the right to 
vengeance of the offended are more related to Afghan tradition than to Islamic faith.152 
Repression of women and imposition of a strict dress code are not merely religious but also 
nationalist expressions of the Taliban project; the use of the burqa, particularly, is not an 
Islamic costume but an Afghan tradition imported from India. The enforcing of the burqa, 
besides the Islamic veil, corresponded not only to logic of purity but also to local values. 153 
According to the Taliban, “Islam and Afghan tradition attach the greatest importance to the 
honor and safety of women in the society,” and covering women’s faces “is a measure that is 
undertaken for the simple reason of protecting the honor, dignity, and personal safety of the 
women in Afghanistan”.154 
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Nationalism, defined not only as an expression of tribal custumes but as a rejection of 
foreign influences, gained ground among the Taliban, while the group’s core value, purity, 
was expressed not only in religious but nationalist terms. Some scholars explain Taliban rule 
as a rejection of Western lifestyles, and consider it “above all an anti-modernist 
movement.”155 However, its ideology was intended to protect the nation from foreign 
corrupting influences, not to wage a political war against the modern world.156 As a western 
ideology, Communism not only represented for many Afghans a painful memory of a brutal 
invasion but an immoral influence within their society. As a result, once in power, the 
Taliban’s first wave of rage was unleashed against social modernization, mass education, 
gender equality, women’s liberties, aesthetic male standards (wear mustachios rather than 
beards), and the public abuse of whiskey, vodka and drugs associated with the “corrupt” 
communist rule. The leaders who installed such “corruption” paid with their lives.157 As soon 
as the Taliban entered Kabul in September 27, 1996, they raided the United Nations 
compound where the last communist president, Mohammed Najibullah, had been confined 
by the Rabbani government since 1992, executed him along with his brother and two more ex 
communist officials, and then displayed their corpses hanging from a pole in the streets of 
Kabul. The same day, it announced to the populace the establishment of an Islamic State in 
Afghanistan158. Along with communist heritage and influence, the Taliban aimed to get rid of 
all pernicious western influences. It asked students and working women to stay home, made 
 
155 Ewans, 269-270; also Misra, 70; and William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, (Hampshire: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2002), 232. 
 
156 Roy, 210. 
 
157 Eric S Margolis, War at the Top of the World, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 49-50. 
 
158 Ewans, 260; also Historical Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions and Insurgencies, plxx. 
55
them wear the purdah, or destroyed cinemas where western movies were projected.159 Radio 
Sha’ria once announced the arrest and condemnation of 28 people for having given young 
men a Leonardo Di Caprio haircut. The Taliban had issued a fatwa or decree of death against 
Leonardo Di Caprio and his co-star, Kate Winslet, should they ever come to Afghanistan, 
because they appeared in a move said to celebrate love out of wedlock.160 And one way of 
understanding the reluctance of the Taliban government to push ahead with a national 
program of education is its true horror of an existing education system still influenced by a 
‘corrupt’ past, and its incapability of directing its efforts toward rewriting Afghan history in 
the middle of a civil war.161 
The Taliban’s nationalism faced an internal contradiction in regard to its conception 
of Afghan territoriality: while it made concrete efforts to reunite what was considered the 
historically Afghan territory with all its ethnic populations, at times it seemed to reach out the 
pashtu population across the Pakistani border. The Taliban government established in 1996 
even refused to recognize the contested Afghan-Pakistani border, and doing so fueled hopes 
of nationalists, who for centuries had dreamed of a pashtun nation called Pashtunistan.162 
This tendency to equate national identity with the aspiration of a particular ethnic group 
undermined the Taliban’s capacity to reach out other ethnic groups. In order to placate the 
minorities’ fears of pashtunization, the Taliban opted to include, and even over-represent, 
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minorities in the governing councils known as shuras.163 Although widely seen in 1994 as a 
movement of “nationalists and pashtuns”,164 the Taliban invited other ethnicities to join its 
national campaign “as long as they do not engage in ‘anti-afghan’ politics” like autonomist 
claims.165 But the fact that the most prominent leaders of the opposition to the Taliban and 
their supporters were Tajiks, Panshjiris and Uzbeks, made these ethnic groups victims of the 
Taliban’s campaign to reunify the country. Although ethnic hatred was used to prompt 
military operations and massacres against the rebel hazaras, the open warfare between 
Taliban and them was always described by the former in nationalist terms.166 
Radicalization Phase 
The Taliban’ ideology emerged in the early 1990s out of the core value of purity and 
a strict rejection of corrupting foreign influences. But after 1998, when the western world 
seemed to reject the Taliban’s style of rule, the Movement’s response was to radicalize its 
nationalist puritanical policies. Later in 2001, when confrontation with the U.S. looked 
inevitable, it decided to incorporate the pan-Islamic revolutionary ideals. The Taliban’s 
realization of the impossibility of forging friendly relations with the West and finding a place 
in the West-ridden international order, had as a result a radicalizing effect. By adoption of the 
revolutionary ideals of Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban redefined itself as an antagonist to the 
West, and particularly the U.S. 
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The ideological transformation of the Taliban into a revolutionary movement brought 
about tangible changes in its day-to-day policies. Between 1998 and 2001, the Afghans were 
bombarded by a series of decrees aimed at instructing the population on the pure forms of 
Islamic life, and harsh punishment of trespassers. From the summer 1998, all girls in schools 
were sent home, the Taliban engaged in systematic destruction of television sets, and people 
were permanently tested on their knowledge of Islam and forbidden to converse with non-
Muslims. They even established a code of punishments for not reciting Muslim prayers 
correctly five times daily. By 2000, men without beards were prohibited from working. The 
next year a complete ban on the internet was imposed. A second decree banning friendship 
with infidels was pushed ahead. The conversion to Christianity, encouraged by some foreign 
humanitarian workers, was to be punished with death. A campaign to destroy public statues 
was started. Later, foreigners were banned from drinking alcohol, eating pork, listening to 
loud music, or even being in contact with members of the opposite sex.167 The Taliban’s anti-
communist stance hardened in 1998 with Omar’s cancellation of amnesties given to former 
communists.168 That same year anti-Hindu decrees were published. The Deobandi, Indian in 
origin, rejected any links to Hindu influence,169 so the Taliban decided to force Hindus living 
in Afghanistan to wear yellow marks.170 Three years later, the measure was reinforced, and a 
ban against Hindi women wearing the Afghan burqa was enforced, but the widespread 
international (and some internal) condemnation made the Taliban reverse this nationalist 
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discriminatory practice. International pressures delayed a trial against Christian workers 
accused of converting Muslims, as well.171 
A different manifestation of the Taliban’s radicalization came by 1999, when it 
became clear that international jihadist Osama Bin Laden exerted direct influence on the 
Movement and Omar himself. In spite of the 1999 and 2000 decrees released by the Taliban 
leader ordering the protection of the giant Buddhist Bamiyan statues as Afghan cultural 
heritage, he made a surprising u-turn six months later, and ordered their destruction as a 
corrupting un-Islamic influence. The journalist Kathy Ganon believes she found an 
explanation: “The final decision was up to Mullah Omar, who sought Bin Laden’s direction. 
Bin Laden said ‘destroy them.’ It drove an irreparable wedge between the Taliban and the 
rest of the world. And it ensured that the Taliban belonged exclusively to Al Qaeda and 
Pakistan.”172 
The overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001 by the U.S. invasion, however, did 
not mean the end of the group’s ideologically motivated armed struggle. Started as a guerrilla 
movement, the Taliban Movement became ruler of an Islamic State for five years and then 
waged a new insurgency against a new set of enemies. Since then, rhetoric and ideological 
warfare are as heated as ever. The imprint left by the Taliban’s nationalist and fundamentalist 
ideology did not fade away after the fall of its government. Scholars reminded in 2002 that 
“support for its ethos and beliefs still lingers.”173 The enduring popularity of the Taliban in 
southern Afghanistan let it survive the 2001 U.S. military invasion. In 2007 it could still rely 
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not only on merely military prowess but also on the support of those committed to the 
version of Islam espoused by the Taliban.174 Its newly acquired jihadist revolutionary 
conscience bore it some fruits in terms of providing a logic for a renewed armed push and 
helping it to build alliances with forces such as Al Qaeda Hekmatyar’s militias. As a result, 
insurgent attacks in Afghanistan against U.S. supporters in the post-Taliban regime 
multiplied four-fold between 2001 and 2006, leading to the death of 3,700 people in the first 
ten months in 2006, at a rate of 600 attacks per month. Taliban’s ideas and cosmology had 
successfully adapted and survived. 
 
Conclusions 
For seven years (1994-2001) the Taliban developed a powerful ideology fed 
principally by nationalistic and fundamentalist (or traditionalist) conceptions that not only 
helped it to take over power and grip it, but later survive again as an insurgency, 
incorporating jihadist and revolutionary elements into its struggle. Starting from a tribal-
pashtun and Traditionalist view of ideal society, the Taliban successfully rallied support to 
wage a war against the ineffectiveness and perceived corruption of the ruling Islamist 
government. The undeniable popularity of the Movement, that promised to bring security and 
purity to Afghanistan, let it conclude a bloody but relatively swift campaign that overthrew 
the besieged government. The rigid indoctrination received by many Taliban combatants in 
the religious schools was a crucial factor in creating a cohesive military unit, while the 
further refining of a nationalist-fundamentalist ideology gave coherence to the process of 
mass conscription and building of political alliances that let it take over most of the country. 
The systematic re-creation of Afghan identity, and the appeal to religious and nationalist 
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myths and symbols not only re-affirmed the Taliban’s grip on Afghan society but let it 
project a vision of nation and state that materialized between 1996 and 2001. The Afghan 
identity and popular perception of the nation, which was severely damaged and fragmented 
after 16 years of civil conflict, motivated the Taliban to re-create the sources of Afghan 
identity as it waged its military campaign. Reviving the myth of a national origin in Ahmed 
Shah Durrani’s rule, and appealing to the foundational principles of Islam, the Taliban 
proposed a total re-foundation of the Afghan society. The tribal pashtun laws and customs 
served as the basis for a process of national reconstruction based on five pillars: territorial 
sovereignty, multi-ethnicity, Sunni Deobandi principles, anti-communism and anti-western 
cultural influence. The Taliban’s nationalist and fundamentalist ideology gave birth to a 
particular political structure, the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan, which had its legal, 
historical and moral basis in the foundational myths of the Afghan nation and Islam itself. 
The re-establishment of an Islamic structure of government inspired by Mohammed’s 
seventh century empire, legitimized by a revalidation of the nation’s first government in the 
eighteenth century, and fused with tribal laws, created a society centered in purity as the 
main indicator of development, and a promise of material improvement once the ongoing 
civil conflict was won. The Taliban’s rejection of western cultural patters did not mean a 
strategic confrontation. On the contrary, its government engaged in a series of diplomatic 
efforts aimed at gaining a place to the Taliban’s emirate in the international community. The 
slow harmonization of Taliban’s views and international demands, which started on topics of 
illegal drugs production and human rights issues, came to a stop because of international 
pressure to hand over the Saudi terrorist Osama Bin Laden. The world’s rejection of the 
Taliban’s government pushed its leadership towards a more ideological radicalization, which 
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ended up in its strategic alliance with the global jihadist movement inspired by Bin Laden 
and the incorporation of a revolutionary discourse into its nationalist and fundamentalist 
ideology.  
The Taliban obtained specific military tactical gains out of the strict ideological 
indoctrination given to its members, and turned its nationalist and fundamentalist ideals into 
physical structures of power that enforced its values and shaped Afghan society, especially 
after 1996. Its ideological adaptation from strategic engagement with the West to outright 
confrontation with the U.S. provided it with a renewed sense of mission, once it returned to 
guerilla warfare. In the next section, I will show how Laurent Kabila effectively turned his 
socialist ideology into a Maoist-inspired State and redefined Congolese identity to save his 
project from a massive military push to oust him. 
 
Kabila’s Maoist State
Laurent Kabila sustained a low-intensity war against Mobutu’s regime between 1964 
and 1996, until he became the president of the renamed Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Defying those who saw in him a regular warlord whose loyalties lay exclusively with loot 
and economic interest, Kabila pushed full-throttle to turn his country into a Maoist State that 
would become the greatest power on the continent, like an African China. He used all the 
power invested in him to design a national indoctrination campaign aimed at ensuring the 
survival of his communist experiment in the long run. Nationalism, as a complementary 
discourse, had proved to be key to his military victory against the Mobutu regime in 1996, 
and in 1998 it enabled his government to survive a cruel war that seemed poised to crush his 
political project in his early stages.  
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In the 1990s, nationalism served Kabila’s purpose of supporting a core ideological 
cause: the construction of a super-power modeled after Chinese Socialism. His ideological 
commitment to that project was reflected in his tangible effort to reorganize the Congolese 
State to resemble more Maoist structures. “We decided to take the People's Republic of 
China like model for our country,” his government announced in 1997. “We do not refuse 
co-operation with other countries, in particular those of the Occident. We simply decided to 
privilege this co-operation with China.”175 From 1997 to 1998, Kabila developed a series of 
concrete political transformations that reflected his socialist promises of creating a new type 
of society. “We are not going on with the preceding regime,” he answered when asked for 
elections, “but creating a new state built on new values.”176 A new power structure centered 
on Kabila as supreme leader, and the widespread cult of personality he promoted, presenting 
himself as “Builder and Father of the Nation”, have been cited as evidence of Kabila’s 
egocentrism and craving for power, although this corresponded to a model similar to Stalin’s 
Soviet Union and Mao’s China.177 
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One concrete example of power reorganization along Leninist principles was the 
creation of a myriad of organizations known as the Commités du Pouvoir Populaire, CPP 
(Committees of Popular Power), which were grouped at the local level in Councils and at 
regional level in Assemblies. The CPP were described by Kabila as “the executive body of 
the State assumed by the people,”178 and in a simple way, “governments of the street.” 179 The 
Committees would monitor schools, neighborhoods and workplaces to both defend the 
revolutionary process (and the central government itself) and effectively administer power at 
the local level on behalf of it.180 
The reorganization of State power has been interpreted by critics as evidence of 
Kabila’s intentions to create an unchecked autocratic government and satisfy his power and 
economic ambition. However, Kabila’s ambition went beyond merely rule: he wanted to 
transform Congolese society. Evidence of this is his plan to indoctrinate Congolese youth 
with socialist and nationalist values. To guarantee that his revolutionary plans would survive 
in the long term, Kabila designed a plan to train Congolese youth for military defense and 
economic production. This plan, which explicitly intended “to train the Congolese man 
ideologically” and “to inculcate the true love for the Fatherland in every Congolese,”181 was 
rendered in the newly created National Service, through which youth would be indoctrinated 
economically and politically, as “the builders of the Fatherland” and the forgers of “the unit 
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and the national cohesion.”182 The National Service truly became an obsession.183 At the 
early stage of the program in 1998, around 6,600 young builders were targeted for 
indoctrination.184 Distrustful of his own generation, Kabila saw Congolese youth “more 
dynamic, stronger, more resistant and also more malleable, prompt to change, and therefore 
more educatable’.”185 As a result of the indoctrination process, the youths would “carry in 
their material luggage the case of the builder, and in their psychic luggage the spirit of the 
patriot, nationalist, resolutely decided to engage and gain the battle of development.”186 
Kabila’s commitment to Maoism was reflected in his major economic policies too. 
Seven months after being sworn in as president, Laurent Kabila explained in detail the 
structure of the new Congolese state and the major policies to be undertaken by it. Since the 
economy would be controlled by the state, he announced the development of triennial plans 
through which he expected to see “multiplied by ten the productivity of the rural worker, 
whose working tools will necessarily undergo modernization,” as the Chinese had done since 
the late 1970s. As early as 1997, Kabila’s government declared a State priority the 
“promotion of domestic economy instead of the [export-led] economy of the Second 
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Republic, in order to produce the full blooming and true prosperity of the Congolese.”187 To 
lead the economic conversion, Kabila relied on the youth, conscripted for military-economic 
purposes through the newly created National Service.188 Kabila himself handed over recently 
acquired machinery for agro-industry to underscore its importance.189 Heavy industrialization, 
as in the Soviet and Chinese models, lay at the core of Kabila’s economic development 
project. “Where is our heavy industry? It is the mission of the State of the people, the mission 
of these people organized in Committees of the Popular Power to create a strong economy to 
make us respected. Because today, it is difficult to support the efforts of the war with this 
economy that only exists to give pleasure to those who adulterate. Therefore, we have the 
mission of creating a national industry. You want to have tanks, armoured tanks? But we can 
produce them ourselves, the facilities exist in certain factories. When we seized power, it was 
just to do that”.190 
Less than one year into his mandate, by November 1997, polls suggested the popular 
euphoria following Mobutu’s overthrow had waned, and Kabila’s government was very 
unpopular. 191 When the crisis exploded in the form of armed rebellion, in August 1998, 
Kabila made use once more of a nationalist discourse to galvanize support, this time adding 
an ethnic component not present in his previous discourses. In August of that year, a Tutsi 
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rebellion erupted in the East: an armed organization known as the Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie (RCD) supported the Tutsi-related Banyamulenge uprising, and, with 
Rwandan backing, started a national campaign to remove Kabila from power. Kabila’s 
response was to appeal to nationalism, successfully turning what seemed to be an internal 
conflict into a patriotic war of national defense. Insightful literature explains the economic 
motivations for the Ugandan-Rwandan invasion of the D.R. Congo in 1998, and the 
Zimbabwean-Namibian-Angolan intervention to save Kabila, which led the United Nations 
to define this war as an economic-driven conflict.192 The human cost has marked this conflict 
as one of the bloodiest in human history. The International Rescue Committee calculated 2.5 
million deaths from August 1998 and April 2001 caused by the war, of which only 350,000 
were due to direct acts of violence. The rest were due to illnesses, disease, starvation and 
crime derived from the humanitarian catastrophe. Forty percent of the victims were women 
and children.193 In a broader account, the Worldwatch Institute estimated 3.8 million deaths 
in Congo from 1998 to 2005. It estimated that even then 31,000 civilians continued to die 
each month.194 
However, under a real threat of being overthrown and seeing his political project 
derailed, Kabila appealed to nationalism, incorporating publicly for the first time an ethnic 
component to his warmaking, calling on the Congolese to expel all foreigners and branding 
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all Tutsi as such.195 As a result, since August 1998, Kabila’s ethnicized nationalism made an 
anti-French and anti-Tutsi sentiment take over Kinshasa.196 Only two days after the (Tutsi-
related) Banyamulenge rebellion starter, a ministerial order spread through the capital: shoot 
“any foreign troops in the capital.”197 The Banyamulenege’s initial demands to be allowed to 
create an autonomous region in the mineral-rich border with Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania 
made Kabila’s war call to maintain national unity more credible. It was reinforced by the 
Rwandan Tutsi claims of sovereignty over North Kivu as part of the old Kingdom of 
Rwanda.198 The ethnicization of the conflict sharpened as soon as several Tutsi ministers 
deserted Kabila’s government and joined the rebels,199 bringing a dramatic escalation of 
government propaganda. According to the Financial Times and The Guardian, Kabila issued 
a statement on Congolese radio encouraging the use of “a machete, a spear, an arrow, a hoe, 
spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, electric irons, barbed wire… to kill the Rwandan Tutsi.”200 
The ethnicization of the conflict gave the Tutsi-led Ugandan government a good reason to 
join the war and support a newly created rebel faction in northern Congo, the Mouvement de 
Libération du Congo (MLC), led by the businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba. The answer in 
Kinshasa was provided by paramilitary units: the systematic targeting and killing of Tutsi 
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population,201 while Kabila insisted his government was fighting an ‘invasion, not a 
rebellion.”202 
Although Kabila’s heavy hand was eventually supported militarily by external allies, 
a skillful use of nationalist discourse proved to be a key factor in turning the tide against the 
rebels, who seemed poised for victory at the beginning of the conflict.203 The war provided 
him with somebody to blame for his government’s economic shortcomings. In spite of the 
persistence of the very same problems that had made Kabila an unpopular ruler -poor 
economic performance, corruption, oppression- his popularity steadily and quickly rose as 
the conflict spread.204 “It is to drive out this nightmare of dismemberment of our nation, that I 
invite you, young women and men of the democratic Congo, with an even more active fight 
and resistance, without mercy, against our enemies, until the day comes when we completely 
recover the territorial integrity, national independence, and international sovereignty of our 
country,” Kabila said in his 2001 New Year’s speech. “To reach this noble and legitimate 
objective, the Democratic Republic of Congo needs to maintain its internal cohesion, without 
the least crack.”205 He portrayed the rebels as foreigners’ puppets and anti-patriots, and called 
upon not-Tutsi Congolese to fight “the anti-patriotic behavior of those of the Congolese who 
had chosen to diabolize the government of their own country.”206 
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Kabila’s true commitment to organize the Congo as a socialist State and the skillful 
use of a nationalist ideology left a durable imprint on his country, even after his assassination 
in 2001. His followers, both moderates and radicals, use him as a symbol of three 
simultaneous struggles: against imperialism, for pan-Africanism, and for national unification. 
The most common myth for Kabila is that of symbol of national unity, in which his socialist 
ideas are downplayed in favor of his nationalist postures.207 Among moderates, Kabila’s 
legacy is one of leadership. “Like that of Lumumba, his example of resistance and 
intransigence will inspire other Congolese. In the next forty years, another Lumumba and 
another Kabila will emerge to clear the road of the enemies of the Congolese people, in order 
to build a free, strong and prosper nation in the middle of the continent, one able to give 
impulse to the development of Central Africa, and why not, all Africa.”208 Among his most 
radical followers, Kabila’s ideological discourse had the potential to feed new insurgencies. 
New organizations like the “Coordination of the Forces Lumumbistes, Mulelistes and 
Kabilistes” explicitly invited to defend Kabila’s legacy and drive the counter-revolutionary 
forces out “like dogs.”209 In order to eliminate the counter-revolutionary forces, they declared 
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themselves ready to reconstitute the political and paramilitary forces established by Kabila.210 
War against Rwanda was expected, denounced or even promoted by these groups.211 
Conclusions 
Laurent Kabila’s revolutionary life combined a series of motivations the most 
important one being his genuine desire to establish a China-inspired socialist State, for which 
purpose he rallied his countrymen’s support by refining and making use of a nationalist 
discourse. Kabila’s ideological formation in many socialist countries, particularly Maoist 
China, and his life as a revolutionary companion of mythical figures such as Patrice 
Lumumba and Pierre Mulele, turned him into a loyal Maoist willing to spend his life on a 
revolution that was to make Congo a regional power and the ideological center for African, 
and even global, socialism. In order to construct such a state, Kabila made use of identity 
politics and embarked on a project of redefining the Congolese nation in terms of opposition 
to the previous regime’s national discourse, while ethnicity only came to prominence after 
1998, when Kabila actively branded Tutsis as foreigners. While a common depiction of his 
career as revolutionary from the 1960s to the early 1990s projected the negative image of a 
lascivious, undisciplined, authoritarian and greedy figure, due to his active engagement in 
illegal cross-border trade at that time, evidence demonstrates that he never ceased to be a 
committed revolutionary, heavily influenced by Mao’s ideas. As the years passed he 
developed a vision of State that he put into practice after 1997. His 1996 insurgency 
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campaign demonstrated how Maoist principles of prolonged popular war were put into 
practice, and Maoist revolutionary principles such as depuration of ranks and 
democratization via local committees were reflected clearly in his government. This structure 
of State and the government that he established reveal that his project went further than a 
mere desire to hold power. He had an ideological commitment to transform Congolese 
society, even foreseeing that it would take more than one generation. The foreign invasion in 
1998 provided Kabila with an opportunity to radicalize his nationalist stances and to dismiss 
the internal opposition as agents of imperialism and foreign aggressors. The cruel war that 
extended officially until 2002 (but whose spin-offs continued afterwards) ended with a 
humanitarian catastrophe for the Congolese population, but a political gain for a previously 
weakened Kabila, who consolidated his image as defender of the nation. Before the end of  
hostilities, Kabila was murdered and succeeded by his son, who dramatically shifted the 
official strategy to a more cooperative relation with the U.S. and Europe, and internal 
political opening. Since his assassination in 2001, the Congolese State and a variety of 
political, paramilitary and civil organizations have worked to preserve, recreate and promote 
Kabila’s historical legacy in different versions, as a nationalist, pan-African and 
revolutionary inspirer. Finally, his enshrinement as part of a sacred trio of national heroes 
(next to Lumumba and Mulele) has encouraged radicals to believe ways of armed revolution 
are not closed yet, and are therefore ideologically prepared to wage a new insurgency if the 
opportunity arises. 
Both the Taliban and the Kabilist forces demonstrated their commitment towards 
ideological causes, obtained concrete benefits at the organizational and military levels, and 
dramatically transformed their societies with them. In the last section, dedicated to 
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Colombia’s FARC, I will provide evidence that demonstrates how ideology is one of the key 
factors that helps to explain the insurgents’ existence after more than four decades of fighting, 
surviving the great crisis of revolutionary movements in the early 1990s. 
 
FARC’s Bolivarian Marxism
The FARC has used ideology in the post-Cold War era as an instrument to achieve 
concrete strategic goals on three levels: internal, national and international. First, I will show 
how the FARC has submerged its members in a process of consistent indoctrination; since 
the end of the Cold War, the FARC’s fast-paced enlargement put at risk the group’s 
cohesiveness around political goals and a central political command, and therefore its 
Socialist-Bolivarian ideological discourse became a crucial unifying instrument. Second, I 
will explain how, by associating its socialist political agenda with Bolivarian ideals, the 
FARC expects to ease the resistance among the Colombian people to see the group as a 
credible alternative to power, at a time when it has started to develop a plan for local 
governance in territories under its control. Finally, I will argue that the FARC has used 
ideology to build regional alliances with radical and leftist groups not necessarily attracted to 
rigid Marxist-Leninist conceptions. International Bolivarianism, while a flexible and 
adaptable ideology, implies a tacit recognition of legitimacy of armed struggle, an option the 
FARC was willing to support beyond the Colombian borders.  
The reinvention of history is a recurrent feature among the twentieth-century guerrilla 
movements’ pursuit of strengthening identity and internal cohesion.212 In the FARC's case, 
its rapid growth during the post-Cold War, in terms of manpower, and its lucrative economic 
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activities derived from warfare, have put it at risk as a cohesive organization bound together 
around well-defined political goals. From that perspective, the use of a strong ideological 
message merging a historically renewed Bolívar and a reinvigorated Communist doctrine is 
more relevant in the post-Cold War period than ever before, in order to keep the troops 
united under a central political command. The group's historical enlargement and that 
projected after 1997 posed a two-fold threat to the organization’s internal cohesion. First, the 
successful financial effort made by the FARC to sustain such a large constituency is based on 
a decentralized system, allowing every front and bloc independently to collect income from 
all kind of legal and illegal sources.213 And second, the political motivations to join the 
armed struggle were being consistently undermined as communism was disregarded as a 
valid political model in the post-Cold War era, pushing the illegal combatants to set new 
objectives for war, such as profitability. The FARC took this threat very seriously. As one of 
its instructors put it: “With the fall of the Soviet Union, the bourgeois ideologists and the 
great capital's mass media have tried to weaken the revolutionary struggle... The fight in that 
field is very unequal since we can't count on the media or the resources they have available. 
Our organization is now making a great effort to fight back on that front.”214 The FARC 
recognizes its guerrillas are constantly exposed to “psychological operations” launched by 
governmental forces aimed at making them give up their socialist war and considers this a 
major threat to their war strategic plan.215 
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Is it possible to demonstrate that the FARC has been consciously using ideological 
indoctrination to prevent fragmentation among its constituents? The rapid rate of recruitment 
of the FARC and its involvement in financially buoyant activities became a threat to the 
organization’s internal cohesion and monolithic commitment towards revolution. Starting 
from a few hundreds in the 1960s, its manpower increased at a dramatic rate, reaching one or 
two thousand members at the beginning of the 1980s, and then to twelve to fifteen thousand 
combatants spread over sixty war fronts in the late 1990s.216 Far from having stopped, in 
1997, the guerrilla group decided to engage in a program that would double its manpower to 
thirty thousand fighters spread among one hundred war fronts.217 With an annual income 
equivalent to one to two percent of the Colombian GDP,218 the FARC constituted the richest, 
largest and best-equipped guerrilla group in Latin America at the end of the 1990s. In 1998, a 
FARC spokesperson explained the importance of their recruits’ political formation before 
any military engagement: “The young person goes through a whole period of political-
military, cultural and ideological formation. The first thing he learns is why we fight. We let 
him know the Guerrilla's Agrarian Program, the Platform for a Government of National 
Reconstruction and Reconciliation which is the Bolivarian Movement for the New 
Colombia's program. Once that stage is accomplished, we could say that he is ready to be 
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part of the mass of our troops.”219 But further than this basic ideological instruction, the 
importance given by the FARC to the ideological commitment of its members is expressed 
clearly in the creation of Colombia’s Clandestine Communist Party and the systematic 
introduction of a Bolivarian mythology that reinvents the guerrilla group’s identity as a 
historical actor.   
Modeled after Lenin’s doctrine, the FARC created in the late 1990s the Clandestine 
Colombian Communist Party (PCCC), which ensured the indoctrination of the FARC’s rank 
and file in Marxist-Leninist thought. As the FARC's founder, Manuel Marulanda, put it, “we 
are, above all, communists.”220 Following Leninist doctrine, the clandestine PCCC 
functioned as a vanguard party, not a mass-conscription organization, and was limited to 
those FARC’s members who were engaged full time in the armed uprising. “The squadron is 
the basic military unit, but in our organization each squadron is at the same time a political 
cell,” explained a FARC trainer. “The communist cell is for us vital in importance, because 
there we manage the quotidian facts of life, especially that which has to do with the cadres’ 
formation. It is in the cell where the combatant develops his political capacity. In the cell, the 
guerrilla fighter must study the all documents of our conferences, from the Central Staff 
Plenary, those of political actualization, etc. It is there, in the cell, where we educate 
ourselves in revolutionary ideas”.221 The pertinence of a vanguard party is explained by a 
member of the Colombian Clandestine Communist Party by the need to confront bourgeois 
ideologies. In his words, the bourgeoisie is ‘conscious that in Colombia there is a ripening of 
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the confrontation between social classes. They know that there are revolutionary political and 
military organizations that not only have the capacity to take over power, but have the 
capacity to build socialism, to drive the conception of new society.”222 Being a FARC 
combatant, and being part of its military structure, implies being part of the PCCC. And 
being a PCCC member means to embrace Marxist-Leninist doctrine. A member of the PCCC 
explained the party had “open positions for those youth who, in their process of ideological 
and political formation, move toward identifying themselves with Marxism-Leninism and 
with the FARC-Ep’s insurrectional project to take power for the people and through the 
people”.223 
Complementing the indoctrination in socialist revolution, the FARC aimed to 
reinforce its members’ loyalty by adding a nationalist sentiment to its struggle, by making 
use of the historical figure of Simón Bolívar. Young members raised in the “post-ideological 
era”, after the end of the Cold War, were presumably harder to indoctrinate. But potential 
recruits found it easier to grasp and defend the vague and simple Bolivarian discourse than 
the more complex Marxism-Leninism. As one young university student demonstrated when 
asked about the organization's ideological base: “We are Leninists because our organization 
practices the Leninist principles of democratic centralism, criticism, self-criticism, and well, 
others. I am not expert in matters of Marxism-Leninism, but all guerrillas know what is 
fundamental about it. And we follow the Bolivarian thought. We carry Bolívar in our soul 
and heart. We are like Bolívar. Each guerrilla represents Bolívar because we fight for 
equality, fraternity, we are anti-imperialists. In practical terms, we want to continue the 
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Bolivarian epic; we want to finish what Bolívar did not do”.224 In its recruitment strategy for 
young people, Bolívar came first and Marx followed.225 Cultural productions such as songs 
and poems played a crucial role in easing anti-ideological prejudices.226 
Bolivarian Masses 
Besides playing a major role in guaranteeing internal cohesion by adding an 
emotional component to the rationalist Marxist-Leninist dogma, the FARC’s Bolivarian 
nationalism served two strategic purposes. First, it developed a more flexible and appealing 
discourse aimed at reaching out the Colombian masses, which in Leninist theory should 
accompany the armed insurrection led by the vanguard party (the PCCC).227 Second, it 
allowed the Colombian people to see the group as a credible alternative power in a time when 
the FARC had started to develop a plan for local governance in territories under its control.  
The FARC’s war strategy explicitly aimed at instituting a network or political institutions to 
keep control of territorial gains by ruling them. “We have been building a party before taking 
over power. We have been building government, because in many areas the real government 
is the FARC,” explained a FARC spokesman “and we have been building the basis of a new 
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State in many parts within the nation’s borders.”228 Given that logic, the FARC has been 
building structures of parallel government at the local level, using both political skills and 
violence to weaken the hand of official authorities in the territories under their control or 
influence.229 They called these structures “New Power.”230 The New Power would be 
hierarchically connected to a higher governmental body of “12 Colombians, representatives 
of all regions in the country and all sectors that identify with the Ten-point Platform for the 
New Colombia.”231 But the FARC’s unprecedented military advance after 1996232 did not 
have a positive effect on the general public’s perceptions of the insurgents. The perceived 
ruthless violence exerted by the FARC, not only in these attacks but in its restless strategy of 
extortions and kidnappings, created an image of a strong but criminalized, dehumanized, 
blackmailing gang which, besides, was linked to drug trafficking. Even for leftist observers, 
the FARC was definitively loosing the battle for public opinion.233 In 1997, the FARC's 
Central General Staff decided to create the Bolivarian Movement, a mass-conscription party 
that saw its most outstanding moment in 2000 with its public launching with open fanfare. 
The Movement’s target was those Colombians not fond of Marxism but willing to join a 
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radical political change; since “not everybody who wants change in Colombia, who wants a 
new Colombia, a different country, agrees with communism or are Marxist-Leninists,” 
explained a Communist Party member.234 The FARC counted on the PCCC and a broader 
Bolivarian Movement to attract these fence-sitters. The Bolivarian Movement, and offshoots 
like the Bolivarian Youth Movement, instructed its membership with “the thought of Simón 
Bolívar as its guide, while in their ideological development, its members grow closer to 
Marxism-Leninism as an important tool to guide the people’s struggle.”235 To approach the 
heterogeneous Colombian political spectrum, the FARC aimed to create a nationalistic link 
with the masses and penetrate their local political structures. According to the FARC, the 
broad Bolivarian Movement’s bases were “millions of Colombians linked to clandestine 
cores, of a variety of forms such as circles, meetings, workshops, clubs, associations, 
councils, galladas, parches, barras, work tables, mingas, brotherhoods, committees and every 
shape their members adopt".236 
Bolivarian spirit and the FARC’s international war 
The FARC’s ideological flexibility and its incorporation of a nationalist-Bolivarian 
discourse provided the organization with an opportunity to connect with a multifaceted 
international network of post-Cold War political organizations not prone to back a rigid 
Marxist-Leninist agenda but supportive of anti-globalization and anti-imperialist values 
compatible with the leftist interpretation of the historical Bolivar conveyed by the guerrillas. 
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And beyond providing the FARC with this international anti-imperialist political platform, 
Bolivarianism enabled it to build a network of political, military and logistical support to 
internationalize its armed struggle, as it advanced a strategy of regional expansion.  
As an agrarian communist insurgency and internationally branded a terrorist 
organization by the U.S. and the European Union (after 2001), the FARC could have been 
politically isolated in the post-Cold war international arena. But the 1990s anti-globalization 
network of non-governmental organizations became a powerful potential source 
of international legitimacy that helped the FARC to break its political isolation. While illegal 
trade networks inserted the FARC into international markets, Bolívar gave them a global 
audience.237 Anti-globalization slogans such as "another world is possible" became part of 
the FARC's rhetoric,238 and Bolívar was placed at the head of the movement On the continent: 
“We make ourselves participants in the anti-capitalist movement expressed through 
mobilizations in Seattle, Quebec, Genoa and Porto Alegre, and the struggle of progressive, 
democratic and revolutionary movements in Latin America and the world that are looking for 
a new international order with social justice,” declared the FARC’s Central Staff. “We make 
the call to unity against capitalism and its imperialist policies, in defense of national 
sovereignty and the rescue of the libertarian ideas of the great universal thinkers championed 
in America by the Liberator, Simón Bolívar.”239 
Beside opening a new international political platform, the FARC’s Bolivarian 
discourse furthered its strategic goal of promoting armed revolutions on the continent, 
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helping to make its own struggle more robust. Concretely, the FARC participated in the 
creation of two international organizations through which its war message could be conveyed: 
the Congreso Bolivariano de los Pueblos (the Bolivarian Congress of Peoples) and the 
Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana (Bolivarian Continental Coordination). Both entities 
encompassed left wing political parties and movements in open defiance of a global 
economic system shaped by free trade and the United States’ economic dominance.  On one 
hand, the Bolivarian Congress of Peoples proposed political action based on the concept of 
resistance.240 On the other, the Bolivarian Continental Coordination regarded politics as just 
one of many legitimate means of resistance: not only did it confer legitimacy upon violent 
methods, but it also suggested their use as part of an integral strategy to bring structural 
changes. 241 The Bolivarian Continental Coordination was clearly an effort by leftist groups, 
especially radical ones, to coordinate their actions in the field, and not merely at the 
discursive level. The Coordination’s governing body signals as part of its main task the 
creation of diverse forms of organizations in each country of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and the establishment of Bolivarian Internationalist Brigades composed of 
sympathizers from elsewhere. Besides Latin American groups, the Coordination declared the 
presence of delegations from Spain (some of the Basque country), Italy, Denmark, France, 
Switzerland, Turkey and Greece for the 2004 first meeting in Caracas.242 In 2003, the 
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FARC’s top commander, Manuel Marulanda, was made honorary president of the 
Coordination, in a shared position with at least nine other representatives, including radical 
leaders who had taken part in violent uprisings in the past, such as Bolivian Felipe Quispe 
Huanca and the representative of Peru’s Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru 
(Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru), Victor Polay Campos.243 
The FARC’s concrete efforts to spread armed revolutions over the continent could not 
be considered more than ambitious plans if there were not evidence of their impact. But there 
is. In 2003, a British journalist source quoted Carlos, a member of FARC’s Bolivarian 
Movement in Lima, describing its presence not only in that country, but also in most of South 
America. “There is a core group of 20 members of the Bolivarian Movement working here. 
We also have cells in Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile and Bolivia”, he said.244 The 
international press reported growing linkages between the FARC and newly formed radical 
formations in Ecuador such as the Ejército de Liberación Alfarista.245 In that country, the first 
years of the twenty-first century saw the emergence of a series of political movements, at 
least two of them as legal parties, inspired by Bolivarian ideals. An Ecuadorian ex-
presidential candidate quoted by Diario El Universo commented that “it would be necessary 
to know each of them, since there could be Bolivarian groups comprised of either outlaws or 
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saints”.246 In Peru, a FARC member identified as El Flaco told the BBC press group in Lima 
about his organization’s activities in that country. He was quoted as saying that “there are 
many of us here from the Bolivarian Movement. We are recruiting Peruvians for the 
revolution and now have almost 1,000 former members of the Shining Path.”247 
Independently of the accuracy of such affirmations, he confirmed the nature of the FARC's 
presence in the neighboring country, on the basis of a Bolivarian tie. The Venezuelan 
government, which has ruled since 1998, has declared itself Bolivarian, and has repeatedly 
refused to condemn the FARC’s armed insurrection and support the Colombian elected 
authorities, although it has avoided explicit endorsement of the guerrillas. Bolivarianism has 
helped the FARC to establish an ideological link with the Venezuelan government that would 
have been harder to create had they presented themselves merely as a Marxist-Leninist 
group248 As the FARC explains, it had established its Bolivarian character “so we can build 
and underline the Colombo-Venezuelan common history and that of the five republics 
liberated by Bolívar”.249 The U.S., singled out by Bolivarianists as the major source of 
imperialism and the strategic enemy of their integrationist ambitions, slowly grew concerned 
in the first years of the twenty-first century about the real potential of the Bolivarian ideology 
to risk U.S. interest and influence in the region.250 “Chavez supports us, and many 
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Ecuadorian military members, too”, a FARC guerrilla fighter claimed, while writing an 
article whose title paraphrased the Communist Manifesto’s introductory lines: “Bolívar's 
specter haunts America, panic in the U.S.”251 
Conclusions 
The end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991 provoked an ideological crisis 
among the socialist and communist insurgencies in Colombia. The FARC, however, persisted 
in its revolutionary armed struggle and, after 1989, decided to reinvigorate its Marxist-
Leninist commitment, incorporating a socialist vision of Bolívar. Ideology played a 
significant role in the FARC’s strategy in the post-Cold War period at internal, national and 
international levels. First, the rapid enlargement of the FARC during the post-Cold War era, 
in terms of manpower, and the lucrative economic activities derived from warfare, had put at 
risk the FARC as a cohesive organization bound together by established political goals. The 
use of a strong ideological message was more relevant in the post-Cold War era than 
previously, to keep the troops united around a central political command. Clearly inspired by 
Leninism, the FARC created in the mid 1990s a new organizational body called Colombia’s 
Clandestine Communist Party, of which every combatant should be member and which 
would be used as a major indoctrination apparatus and as a vanguard party of full-time 
revolutionaries. Second, the FARC expected to ease the reluctance of people in Colombia to 
see the group as a credible power alternative, among populations that were not strongly 
attracted by Marxism-Leninism, by identifying its political agenda with Bolivarian ideals in a 
 
FARC reference to the U.S. Santa Fe in Ricardo G. “Entrevista al Comandante Ricardo G.,” internet source 
cited above. 
 
251 Eduardo Soto-Trillo, 209-210. 
85
time when it started to develop a plan for local governance in territories under its control. 
Another organizational body, the Bolivarian Movement, modeled as well along Leninist-
structured lines, was created to complement the vanguard party’s mission by reaching out to 
the Colombian masses and infiltrating their organizations at the local level, in the hope of 
stirring mass mobilizations to accompany its armed strategy. And third, the FARC’s 
socialism, attached to Bolivarian nationalism, helped the FARC to build alliances with 
radical and leftist groups not necessarily persuaded by rigid Marxist-Leninist conceptions. Its 
renewed socialist vision, while a flexible and adaptable ideology, served as a platform upon 
which to build international legitimacy for armed struggles, and create networks of political-
military supporters in the region. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, I have shown how the three insurgencies examined, Afghanistan’s 
Taliban, D.R. Congo’s Parti pour la Révolution des Peuples, and Colombia’s FARC, 
consistently advanced an ideological discourse throughout the first decade of the post-Cold 
War era, which combined nationalism with either religious fundamentalism-traditionalism or 
else socialism-anti-liberalism, all in versions adapted to local needs and contexts. Post-Cold 
War ideologies, as has been shown, are characterized by their flexibility. In the Afghan and 
Colombian cases, core values –i.e. purity, social justice- guard the insurgent organization’s 
identity, internal coherence and moral stance, while the nationalist discourse provide them 
with a vehicle to address the masses, a much larger and more heterogeneous political 
collective. In the Congolese case, nationalist and socialist discourses orbited around a vision, 
instead of a core value, that of building an African Super-power. 
Ideology played an extensive role in the post-Cold War insurgencies examined here, 
beyond the discursive level. Ideology served the rhetorical purpose of legitimizing armed 
struggles. But it also proved crucial to determine the insurgent organization’s internal 
structures and its apparatus of power in territories under its control, to shape their 
governmental policies, and to contribute to strategic and tactical gains on the battlefield. 
At the organizational level, the Taliban Movement’s nationalist-fundamentalist 
ideology materialized in specific State structures with historical models and a particular style 
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of government based on religious and tribal customs. In the D.R. Congo, Kabila built 
a series of structures that resembled a Maoist-style State and aimed at implementing long-
term plans for societal change, while concentrating the ultimate power in himself as the 
“Father and Builder of the Nation.” In Colombia, the FARC created new Leninist political 
structures and activated a network of political-military cells in order to advance its insurgent 
war and implement a Soviet-style democracy in the territories under its control. 
At both strategic and tactical levels, ideologies ensured these movements’ internal 
cohesion as political-military entities, turned discipline into military advantage, and 
mobilized national and international political, logistical and military support for their armed 
struggles. In the three cases examined, the insurgent groups crafted identities based on 
rational and emotional values that differentiated them from other armed actors, favored their 
recruitment efforts, discouraged resistance among populations under their influence, and 
facilitated outreach. 
 
*** 
 
If ideologies, as I have demonstrated, are a functional component of modern 
insurgencies and help to explain their reason for existence, why have they been so 
underestimated by scholarly research regarding armed conflicts in the post-Cold War period? 
Two factors can help to explain this phenomenon. First, the scholarly work focusing on 
economics has come up not only with a sound theory to explain the emergence and 
protraction of armed conflicts, but has also increasingly provided statistical evidence that 
demonstrates a co-relation between economic opportunities and insurgencies, downplaying 
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the need to account for the political and cultural dimensions. And second, other alternative 
theories that take into account the concept of ideology, such as Identity Politics, 
Manipulative Elites and Symbolic Politics, provide insightful explanations to the political 
dimension of conflicts, but nevertheless acknowledge nothing but a very narrow definition of 
ideology that discourages them from using it as a major category of analysis.  
A narrow definition of ideologies, understood merely as the Cold War’s capitalist 
liberal democracy or Marxist-inspired socialism, excludes elements such as myths, symbols, 
ethnicity, nation and religion that play along with its more rational component to constitute 
whole cultural systems, which clearly shape political settings. Defining ideology as a cultural 
system based on beliefs that govern social relations and create collective identities 
(nationalism being one manifestation of the latter) creates a category of analysis capable of 
explaining in detail the full role of culture in armed conflict. The ubiquity of ideologies in the 
post-Cold War era, as shown in this paper, demands their study taking this broader 
perspective, in order to reveal new understandings that the logic of economics or statistical 
evidence may not provide. 
Moreover, it is interesting to see the way in which an ideology that fits into the 
traditionally more narrow definition of ideology, socialism, seems to be ignored in the post-
Cold War period. The failure of a global-reach socialist ideological bloc between 1989 and 
1991 has been interpreted as a failure as well of the localized smaller-scale socialist political 
(and sometimes military) projects that have demonstrated resilience enough to reach the 
twenty-first century and adapt to a more globalized world by creating international support 
networks bonded by ideological cores such as anti-imperialism. The existence of local 
political alternatives to liberal-democracy based on Islamic principles of diverse sort and the 
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worldwide use of nationalist discourses add to the evidence that ideological struggles are, in 
fact, still fought at local and regional levels, and that liberal-democracy continues to be 
heatedly challenged in much of the world. 
The scholarly recognition that ideologies are a major functional component of some 
armed conflicts implies acknowledging the participants as political actors. Analyzing the 
existence and role of the ideological component of subversion is therefore a valuable tool to 
separate political insurgencies from other types of organized violence such as cartels, and 
rent-seeking criminal gangs. 
The recognition of an ideological component in armed organizations opens new 
alternatives such as the opportunity to explore political solutions from a more informed 
perspective. Understanding armed conflicts not only as economic-driven systems but also as 
ideological struggles is therefore indispensable to conflict resolution. The underestimation of 
the insurgents’ ideological incentives reduces the chances of success of any peace initiative. 
Acknowledging the importance of ideological warfare will encourage political strategies to 
complement, or sometimes replace, military operations. Resulting political gains may 
compensate, or even surpass, those obtained by force and have direct effect on the military 
developments. 
But how to win an ideological battle? A straight answer would be “by fighting ideas 
instead of people.” Addressing those conflictive contexts that push people to look for 
political alternatives, sometimes by violent means, may help to prevent insurgencies from 
occurring. In that respect, effective communication strategies aimed at demonstrating the 
comparative benefits brought by one ideology over another may discourage the emergence of 
violent alternatives. 
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Philosopher Thomas Sowell’s recipe to outlaw wars includes “a muting of militant 
rhetoric” and “a de-emphasis of nationalism or patriotism.”252 But the proved impossibility of 
escaping from ideological paradigms, even in the post-Cold War era, only leaves the hope of 
making a positive use of them. 
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